


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FBIS 50th Anniversary Note

To Our Consumers:

This year the Foreign Broadcast Information Service observes its 50th anniversary.

The service, first called the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, was established in 1941 prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. At the time, a number of U.S. Government officials were concerned about the content of foreign radio broadcasts—a relatively new means of conveying information and propaganda across borders. On their advice, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in late February 1941 allotted money from his emergency fund to institute the recording, translating, transcribing, and analyzing of selected foreign broadcasts for the U.S. Government. During World War II the service demonstrated that monitoring was a fast, economical, and reliable way to follow overseas developments.

Today the Foreign Broadcast Information Service provides its consumers throughout the federal government, according to their diverse official interests, with information from a broad range of foreign public media. FBIS information also is available to readers outside of the government, through the National Technical Information Service. Objectivity, accuracy, and timeliness are our production watchwords.

We members of the current staff of FBIS extend our thanks to consumers for their interest in FBIS products. To past staffers we extend our thanks for helping the service reach this anniversary year. At the same time, we pledge our continued commitment to providing a useful information service.



R. W. Manners
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

East Europe

JPRS-EER-91-023

CONTENTS

21 February 1991

POLITICAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mlynar on Post-November 1989 Developments	<i>[TVORBA 9, 16 Jan]</i>	1
Deputy Suspects StB of Disinformation Activity	<i>[OBCANSKY DENIK 26 Jan]</i>	7
Further Details on Tension Within Civic Forum	<i>[OBCANSKY DENIK 29 Jan]</i>	8
Slovaks Subservient to Czechs Criticized	<i>[LITERARNY TYZDENNIK 21 Dec]</i>	9
VPN Seen as Only Guarantee of Reform's Success	<i>[LIDOVE NOVINY 23 Jan]</i>	12
1st Volume of Jozef Tiso's Biography Praised	<i>[BRATISLAVSKE LISTY No 1, 1991]</i>	12
Background of Moravian Autonomy Drive Analyzed	<i>[LIDOVE NOVINY 29 Jan]</i>	14
Former Dissident on Social Attitudes, Mores	<i>[TVORBA 29 Dec]</i>	15

POLAND

Walesa's 1st Month as President Reviewed	<i>[RZECZPOSPOLITA 5 Feb]</i>	20
Future of Solidarity's Citizens Committee	<i>[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 7 Jan]</i>	21
Katowice Voivod Explains Regionalization Proposal		22
Economic Possibilities Stressed	<i>[WPROST 16 Dec]</i>	22
Opole Voivod Opposes Proposal	<i>[WPROST 16 Dec]</i>	24

MILITARY

BULGARIA

Shortages Affect Military Supplies		25
Introduction	<i>[NARODNA ARMIYA 4 Dec]</i>	25
Food	<i>[NARODNA ARMIYA 4 Dec]</i>	25
Fuel	<i>[NARODNA ARMIYA 4 Dec]</i>	26
Clothing, Soap	<i>[NARODNA ARMIYA 4 Dec]</i>	26
Curtailing Privileges	<i>[NARODNA ARMIYA 4 Dec]</i>	27

ECONOMIC

HUNGARY

Danish Company To Man EC Office in Budapest		28
<i>[Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE 1 Feb]</i>		28
'Stricter' Stock Market Regulations Introduced	<i>[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 22 Dec]</i>	28
National Bank Head Calls for Full Debt Payment	<i>[HETI VILAGGAZDASAG 22 Dec]</i>	29
Death Struggle of State Enterprise Described	<i>[NEPSZABADSAG 15 Jan]</i>	31

POLAND

Danes To Cofound Technological Institute	<i>[Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE 28 Jan]</i>	33
Silesian Bank: Contacts With France, Italy	<i>[RZECZPOSPOLITA 27 Dec]</i>	33
Trade With Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Proposed	<i>[RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE 4 Dec]</i>	34
Commentary on Changes in New Communications Law	<i>[RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 Jan]</i>	35
State Railroad in Need of Drastic Reform		37
Tonnage Transport Dropping	<i>[RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 Jan]</i>	37
Budget Problems Viewed	<i>[RZECZPOSPOLITA 15 Jan]</i>	38

SOCIAL

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Returning Emigre on Future of Czech Culture *[TVORBA 16 Jan]* 39

POLAND

Slowdown in Births, Infant Deaths Noted *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 29 Dec]* 41

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mlynar on Post-November 1989 Developments 91CH0315A Prague TVORBA in Czech 9, 16 Jan 91

[Article in two installments by Zdenek Mlynar: "What Comes After 'Real Socialism'?"]

[9 Jan pp 3-4]

[Text] The political revolution in Central Europe occurred with the unambiguous support of the majority of the population. It removed the Communist Parties of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia from their share in holding power. It can be said that in these countries new groups in power (a new power elite) have a broad consensus and are thus even fulfilling the fundamental prerequisites of democratic legitimacy involved in the new power structure.

However, this consensus is basically negative in character: It is created by the agreement of the vast majority of society in rejecting the system of "real socialism" as an economic and political system, as well as an ideology which wanted to legitimize this system. This consensus encompasses even the institutional sphere, that is to say, people first agreed to disestablishing and fragmenting existing institutional structures, ranging from the Communist Party through various obvious likenesses in the so-called national front, encompassing the trade unions, youth organizations, etc., all the way through the power organs of the state, particularly the political police, but also including the apparatus for the administrative control of the economy.

Thus, the new power elite can gradually disrupt all fundamental segments of the old system and this process is ongoing without a generally more significant sociopolitical resistance. The extensive bureaucracy connected with the old system is attempting to adapt to the "new masters," and all of this facilitates the peaceful progress of the revolution. However, it is natural that a new functional institutional system cannot come into being at the same pace as that at which the old institutional system is being destroyed. Essentially, therefore, there ensues a period during which the old system no longer functions and the new system is still not functioning.

Given this situation, the new power elite is not so much leaning on clear institutional structures or on clear action programs as it is relying on general intentions, ideas (ideologies), and desires which are capable of gaining majority support in society. Clearly, the emotional side of politics is dominating over the rational side.

Toward the Future Through the Past?

It would appear that there exist mostly primitive, but generally effective ideas which are gaining mass support and which, thus, create a certain kind of hope, both for the governing and also for the governed. This hope is

capable of acting, in part, as an integrating and organizing force or, in part, at least, of giving the appearance of being such a force.

It is the idea of returning to the situation which preceded the introduction of the Stalinist ("real socialism") system in the given country. Stated in a simplified manner: The notion arises that, beginning at a certain point (in part, following 1945, but also in part, following 1938), developments took a bad path, which has led to the disaster of today. The way out of the current crisis is perceived as the return to that point after which it is necessary to throw the railroad switch and get on another rail—that rail upon which the currently developed West European countries embarked. After some time on this other rail, conditions in the subject country should approximate the conditions of today's mature West. For this to happen expeditiously, it is, however, necessary to take on as much as possible of the current Western economic, social, and political structures because these are proven structures leading to success. Naturally, this means that as much as possible of the existing structures, which are connected with the failure of "real socialism" should be repudiated and liquidated as rapidly as possible.

There is no point in criticizing either the new ruling elite or the majority of society governed by it for adopting this primitive and illusory notion. After all, it is the result of virtually 50 years during which the society of "real socialism" was isolated from the remainder of the world, 50 years of the inability of these societies to see the real conditions of the contemporary West. It is also the result of a status when monopolistically governing communist parties and their ideologies, which prevailed for decades, hammered the notions into the heads of society that politics was practically omnipotent, that the correct political program and political power (institutions) are in themselves a success: That which the party wants is already as if it were accomplished. Paradoxically, without being aware of it, the anticommunist opposition today is basically making similar considerations.

The illusory idea regarding the return to the badly thrown switch (1945 or 1938), however, lies in the fact that the point to which society should return no longer exists in practice, but rather exclusively only in the memory, in the social (national) consciousness. That is why only an idealized consciousness can actually return to that point, but not any economic, social, or political reality.

The illusory nature of the idea that the simple adoption of West European models of society and their automatic functioning in the direction of creating a society of well-being and a pluralistic democracy in East Central Europe is based on the fact that the situation, which was created by virtually a half century of historic development in the West, is perceived as the consequence of certain structures and institutions. However, these are,

of themselves, the results of a complicated developmental process and the very specific conditions controlling it. The illusory nature of the notion involving the consequences of imitating the West also lies in the fact that it is expected that a "return" of society after 40 or 50 years will create a society having the everydayness of the contemporary West.

In actual fact, however, efforts to achieve such a "return," to the extent to which they are even doable, will, in my opinion, much more likely lead to reviving a number of disputes and tendencies which governed the present "post-Stalinist" society some 10 years ago, and which are hiding somewhere in the political culture of every country to this day. Moreover, these disputes and conflicts will be multiplied by the institutionalized heritage of several decades of "real socialism." However, all of these are factors and conditions which place the situation of today's East European countries miles away from the conditions of contemporary West Europe (rather than bringing it closer).

As for the sociopolitical situation which prevails following the failure of the system of "real socialism," one can designate the most important conflict as being the conflict between the expectations of people and the real possibilities of development. The expectations are overly great: An optimally functioning market economy should come about in the foreseeable future which would guarantee the consumer level and social security like those which exist in the countries of the West, accompanied by a political democracy which would also function like that of those countries. Actual developments must come into visible conflict with these expectations relatively soon.

This conflict will most likely be able to disrupt the original negative consensus which grew at the time of the struggle against the system of "real socialism" relatively rapidly. I therefore believe that the present stage of development must be considered as a relatively brief transition (perhaps one to two years) toward political and social development which, following many conflicts, will decide what will replace the overthrown system of "real socialism" in which country for the long run.

Disillusionment and Its Political Consequences

Excessively high expectations which are, in actual fact, not fulfillable will bring about disappointment and disillusionment in various areas of social life. An atmosphere of hope was able to arise suddenly as a sociopsychological reaction to the political revolution which relatively rapidly and painlessly removed the old system of "real socialism" following years of protracted crisis. However, this atmosphere of hope will be diminishing gradually as a result of a number of partial, constantly arising and repeated, social tensions and conflicts which will be breaking out in various spheres of social life.

The first serious difficulties and the beginnings of a possible new crisis following the execution of the political revolution can, therefore, more likely be expected to be a gradual multifarious process rather than a rapid,

steep, and sudden fall and the sudden evaporation of support for the new political elite. The actual social nature of this process will obviously be concealed in the beginning, since everything will still occur in an atmosphere in which the emotional side of politics is dominating over the rational side. However, it is already now possible to observe the indications of this development.

The first reaction of the new power elite to this process is and will continue to be based on the effort to prolong the effects of the mass "negative consensus." This means that, insofar as possible, the new power elite will endeavor to dampen manifestations of disillusionment and dissatisfaction by directing attention to the past as much as possible. Politically, this must then take on the image of various constantly repetitive anticommunist campaigns.

The model of "seeking the enemy" as the main reason as to why reality is not changing as rapidly and as expressly as had been promised, this model for all revolutions and turnovers will find application as the first recipe. Explanations of the conflict between expectations and reality by claiming that the heritage of the past was much worse than had originally been thought, that the followers of the old order (the communist "nomenklatura") are systematically sabotaging the new policies, that the old ideology has not yet been sufficiently defeated and replaced by a new ideology which is the only one showing the path toward success, etc. These are the essential phenomena accompanying political progress according to such a model. Actual success, that is to say, the actual renewal of a broad social consensus, however, will result from this policy to a constantly lesser degree and, in the end, not at all, because it does not impact on the actual reasons for a weakening consensus and for a growth of dissatisfaction.

The actual reasons lie in the fact that the original extremely broad ideological-political support for the new power elite must essentially disintegrate to the extent to which its social base (that is to say, the strata whose social interests gain as a result of the new policies) is found to be quite narrow. In other words: Ideological-political support in the form of negative consensus was created not by the new, but by the old regime with which the overwhelming majority of people were dissatisfied because it somehow restricted and suppressed their real social interests (not only material interests, but also emancipatory interests in the political and spiritual sphere). This cannot lead to the permanent acquisition of a real social base for the new regime. Such a basis can result only from a status in which the real social interests of the majority of society are better satisfied than they were during the old regime, and when the majority of the people perceive this and recognize it as a meritorious function of the new power elite.

In some areas of social life, the new power elite may be able to achieve this. It is easiest where it is sufficient to eliminate the former artificial power-administrative obstacles (prohibitions, etc.) so as to satisfy certain

interests: for example, the freedom of speech and assembly, the freedom of belief and religion, autonomy for nationalities and regional interests, actual sovereignty of the national state in relations specifically with the USSR, etc. It is much more difficult in areas where it is necessary not only to eliminate old obstacles, but also to create qualitatively new and actually functioning mechanisms and structures. Particularly, therefore, in the economic life and in social relationships connected therewith.

Decline of the "Negative Consensus"

Following the failure of "real socialism," an actual process involving attempts to change the economic, social, and political structures is ongoing in East European countries under the distorting appellation of "economic reforms." Those groupings of the new power elite which acquired a decisive influence over the concept of "economic reforms" following the political revolution generally quite openly espouse liberal ideologies in their neoconservative images and their practical example is especially the economic policy of the British conservatives of the Margaret Thatcher era. To a varying extent, but generally openly, they also speak of their intention to introduce capitalism as the only possible prospering economy. Toward this end, however, they need to reshape the former social structures of "real socialism" into a structure corresponding to the images of the liberal neoconservatives: It is particularly necessary to once more create a stratum (class) of private owners and entrepreneurs on one side and a mobile stratum of hired workmen, even exposed to the pressures of unemployment, on the other side.

A power elite sinking in this manner is, therefore, quite objectively attempting to realize the completely essential process of destroying the structures of the command economy and the essential nascence of economic entities capable of autonomous action (enterprises capable of market behavior) as a process in which a qualitatively new social structure should arise as a result of denationalization and privatization. However, the more such a structure will tend truly to come into being in practice, the more the social basis of the liberal neoconservative ideology and policies will be weakened. This is so because the immediate gain would only devolve upon the social minority, while the majority would be gradually impacted to a varying extent (not only through unemployment, but also through a reduction in real wages as a result of inflation, the demand for greater output without immediate increases in the standard of living, etc.).

This does not mean that for these reasons the liberal neoconservative concepts could not prevail in some countries. However, this will not be possible without social conflicts, without strong social tensions, without resistance on the part of large social forces. Definitely, the atmosphere of the original general "negative consensus" and the more or less automatic support of the policies of the new power elite connected therewith

cannot then prevail. At the same time, it is also possible, however, that social resistance in some countries will be so strong that liberal neoconservative concepts will not prevail in practice. Alternatives, however, can be not only concepts of democratic socialism (see details later), but also various forms of compromises between the market model of an economy and its restriction with respect to social consequences by the authoritative political power. The fact that such an alternative would, of course, not lead to the development of conditions in harmony with developed West Europe is certain. Of course, these conditions would also not be brought about by the success of the liberal neoconservatives: They, too, would have to refer to "better tomorrows" in the event they were to prevail—something which, after the experience of "real socialism," would hardly be found credible by the people.

Forms of Disenchantment

It is natural that during the course of such conflict development involving society, disenchantment and disappointment impact different strata in different forms. I consider one of the politically most dangerous forms of disenchantment to be the political disappointment which must be experienced by the contemporary young generation: People who knew nothing other than the totalitarian "real socialist" forms of injustice, wrongdoing, inequity, lies, and violence, people who supported the revolutionary political turnaround with moral motives and idealistic fervor; these people will be confronted here with new forms of the same defects and immoral characteristics of the new social system which is no longer totalitarian. Frustration resulting from this could sometimes acquire a completely destructive character.

The political consequences of all of these predictable processes can first manifest themselves in the polarization of the political spectrum in society, as well as in the growing degree of passiveness of a sizable portion of society, in the disinclination to engage in political activity. Both tendencies can already be seen today with particular intensity in Poland; as far as passivity is concerned (for example, nonparticipation in municipal elections—less than 40 percent), it is specific in Hungary. In Czechoslovakia, where the entire development began later than elsewhere, both tendencies are, for the time being, only in their indicative stages. Gradually, however, the originally united opposition movement "against totalitarianism" (for example, Solidarity in Poland, Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia) will necessarily become politically polarized into followers of the liberal neoconservative solution (the right) and into social reformers (the left).

[16 Jan pp 3-5]

[Text] A pluralist parliamentary democracy, in the form in which we know it from today's developed countries of the West, is the product of many years of development, of many conflicts as well as defeats (particularly prior to

1945) and, in the final analysis, is the result of the attenuation of social conflicts in those most advanced countries in conjunction with the development of the so-called consumer stage of the industrial society and of a "social state." In the East European countries, which wish to emulate this form of democracy, however, there now exists a totality of conditions which are highly unsuitable for such a political system.

First, it can be anticipated that, in the near future, there will be an increase in social tensions and conflicts resulting from them. In and of itself, this tends to make the development of political pluralism more difficult along with the concomitant tolerances of various interests and opinions, making it more difficult for peaceful discussion, for patient procedural discussion in parliamentary bodies, and, on the other hand, plays into the hands of efforts to achieve rapid, radical, and authoritatively accepted and realized decisions. It is impossible to forget that even in West Europe, crises and serious social tensions prior to World War II led to the downfall of parliamentary democracies and to the victory of authoritarian regimes and fascist dictatorships.

Other pitfalls for democracy are lurking in the historic past of the countries of "real socialism" and in the political culture anchored in that past. At that, what is involved here is both a past such as "real socialism," as well as a past which is much older. Insofar as there actually is a certain return (at least in ideology, in the social consciousness) to the period prior to 1945 or 1938, it is well to recall the kind of political conditions which existed in the given countries at that time. All of the countries which are today emerging from "real socialism," with the sole exception being Czechoslovakia, did not have parliamentary democratic systems during that past, but had authoritarian semifascist dictatorships. The governing ideologies were all ideologists of nationalist provenience. There is no reason to believe that to the extent to which even the former political traditions act within the social (national) memories as a potential political force, that these memories will be purged of these expressly antidemocratic elements.

The traditions of authoritarian forms of government and particularly the belief in the sovereign national state as the principal and most hope-filled instrument for the attainment of human longings—these are the dangerous antidemocratic foundations of political culture in these countries. The national state did not have the opportunity here for free development: Apart from a brief period from 1918 to 1938, it was always suppressed by some form of hegemony, most recently by the USSR. In contrast to today's West Europe, there are no positive experiences here involving the organic forms of supranational integration, be it economic or political. On the contrary, the political power hegemony, which was touted as integration, was only fertile ground which nourished old and unfulfilled (and therefore also not overcome) illusions regarding the possibilities of having a national state.

If these countries of "real socialism," which have today been liberated from the grasp of the Soviet hegemony, speak of "returning to Europe," they believe that this also means the opportunity to develop national statehood without regard to the developments of the past 50 years. On the one hand, they proclaim efforts to join the European Community; on the other hand, however, they cultivate the political consciousness of national exclusivity and frequently even intolerance and are only able to solve their mutual and internal nationalities conflicts with difficulty.

It is also not possible to underestimate the influence which Stalinism and the system of "real socialism" in general had on the political culture of these countries. These elements constitute a specific reservoir of anti-democratic tendencies. Perhaps the worst heritage of "real socialism" in political culture is the practical habit according to which always only one variant of variously possible solutions can be tolerated and other variants, which were not able to prevail at a given moment in the sphere of political power, are to be eradicated and suppressed.

It is precisely this character of political culture in conjunction with its older authoritarian traditions that leads to a rebirth of something like an official (and state-supported) ideology following the political revolution and the failure of "real socialism"—frequently even without the conscious participation of the leading representatives of the new political elite—and that conformism with regard to this ideology is again demanded. Anyone who wishes to oppose the new governing ideology risks being categorized among the "enemies of the revolution." Intolerance, dogmatism in ideology, and a tendency toward censorship and control of ideas are condemned and, in practice, overcome only in their communist form; however, they are not overcome as fundamentally unacceptable characteristics and methods of political action.

What is least surprising is that such characteristics govern the political thinking and actions of nationally oriented groups. More paradoxical is the fact that it is also the followers of liberal ideologies—the economic neoconservatives—who, in actual fact, frequently contemplate and act under the strong influence of these totally antiliberal habits.

It is particularly typical for present-day Czechoslovakia that efforts to "introduce a market economy" are completely dogmatically sticking to the implementation of selected changes, in political practices, as well as in the officially propagandized ideologies, following which it is assumed that everything will already run automatically and will only have the desired results. The most important thing is the introduction of private ownership, according to today's followers of liberal neoconservatism. In a similar manner, the Communists at one time claimed that the main thing was the destruction of this form of ownership and then the "functioning of mechanisms" which will lead to economic development will

necessarily follow. Today, the liberals expect that after the reintroduction of private ownership there will ensue "a functioning of the market mechanisms" and that this will lead to prosperity. Anyone who is opposed is ridiculed and, to the extent that this is possible, is silenced. Proof of the truthfulness of the proclaimed thesis is not sought by means of critical analyses in the country in question, but allegedly stems from references to "world experiences," from the fact that "this has been confirmed" in other countries.

It is turning out that a tendency which is typical for "modernizational" efforts in the developing countries in general is working against democracy in political culture. Examples of and models for development are being sought outside of the country; external assistance is being anticipated and the successful emulation of foreign models which promise salvation is considered to be the most important factor. In actual fact, however, development of democracy can only be optimal if opportunities for activity and for the democratic search of internal forces are opened up. Of course, this means the release onto the political scene as decisive actors of existing social entities of the given society; not waiting for such entities which "for the time being do not yet exist," but which must be artificially created by those in political power so that they can play out the role prescribed by the scenario.

Does a Leftist Alternative Development Exist?

The overall political and ideological atmosphere following the failure of "real socialism" in all the countries examined is primarily characterized by the complete discreditation of the concept "socialism" and, together with that, the concept of the political left. It is precisely in the socialist leftist ideology (and this does not only mean Marxist and Leninist ideologies) that the most germane reason for all failures, sufferings, and frequently even crimes of the recent past are sought: It is as though prior to the advent of the communists to power, no fundamental problems and conflicts existed, as though social violence had come into being only with the government of a certain ideology and did not have its specific prehistory and its specific social causes. Because the rejection of certain concepts and certain ideologies is a relatively simple matter, it can be implemented with the use of loud words and rapidly; the entire force of the resistance to long years of a dictatorial regime is cast at ideological symbols and concepts, particularly at the words of communism, socialism, Marxism, and, in the end, at the "left" in general.

In so doing, the starting point is an identification of the concept of socialism with the system which has just been overthrown and which, for decades, proclaimed itself to be the only possible personification of the socialist (Marxist) idea. Thus, leftism is identified with totalitarianism and its rejection necessarily means the rejection of leftist tendencies. Moreover, this is aided by the conduct exhibited by certain portions of the communist parties who previously wielded monopoly power. These are streams within these parties (in various countries, they are variously strong and appear in differing forms), which, even following the

downfall of "real socialism" in principle, identify further socialist (leftist) prospects with an effort to preserve as much of the wreckage of the failed system as possible, with efforts to fortify themselves and to "dig in" in this wreckage. These streams hope that difficulties and social tensions and conflicts which necessarily follow the introduction of capitalist tendencies into those societies which were once under "real socialism" will once more bring to the political scene those social forces which would give priority to the old system of social confidence. The new prospects of socialism are then connected with the defense of their interests.

Even without the above, the relatively strong feeling of anticommunism, which, in a certain form, is essential, as a natural reaction to decades of monopoly government on the part of communists, tends to grow more and is transposed into an irrational opposition to the "left" in general. In other words, if we speak of a leftist alternative development, I perceive this concept to be something altogether different from the return to a system of "real socialism." Several decades of practice have demonstrated that such a system leads to isolation from world development and excludes from society not only some undesirable (social) consequences of the capitalist developmental tendencies, but even their positive effects upon the dynamics of development involving production forces in the broadest sense of the word. By this tendency, I mean particularly the fact that the effort to evaluate the capital invested in the economic reproduction process plays a decisive role, that is to say, the effort to use the most efficient utilization of all production factors to increase profit.

Rivalry With Respect to Hegemony

In the countries of the former "real socialism," there is now concern that, in the process of dismantling the old system, it should not be generally forgotten that a certain defense of the interests of people against the pressures of capital must be guaranteed in the face of the newly "permitted" capitalist trends. By far not all of the noncapitalist characteristics of "real socialism" were truly socialist characteristics. They were frequently reactionary in nature as precapitalist economic, social, and political power structures. But this does not at the same time indicate that in accomplishing a qualitative change of this noncapitalist system the existing forms and relationships always and everywhere need to be replaced by relationships which are unilaterally subordinated to the capitalist trend. Objectively, the opportunity looms for a socialist trend for efforts to achieve its own hegemony.

I believe that such rivalry (in part, also essentially a conflict) to achieve a hegemony of capitalist or socialist tendencies will be playing out particularly in the following spheres:

- In the development of the social structure of society which will be particularly concerned with the extent and sources of social inequity, that is to say, with seeing to it that certain social strata not fall below the

minimum standard of living and that the deciding source of social advantage will be the yardsticks of work output rather than the ownership of capital.

- In the sphere of social security for all where the concern will be particularly to see to it that minimum social conditions (in relationship with the yardsticks for the given degree of civilizational development in each country) be guaranteed for all groups and individuals impacted as a result of the functioning of capitalist tendencies in such a way that they are threatened by being excluded from society, by falling beneath the minimum existence levels, by having to vegetate and possibly by dying as a result of penury.
- In the standing of various social minorities (in accordance with social, nationality, cultural, generational, etc., divisions) and in the positions of parts of society (for example, women) against which the hegemonies of a capitalist trend in principle discriminate without any corrective influences and effective resistance.
- In the sphere of ecology where the concern is not only for technical problems (reduction of emissions, purity of water, etc.), but also that the interests of the capitalist trend could, in certain cases, be restricted through the use of effective methods where these interests run counter to the requirement to preserve an ecologically defect-free environment for the present and for the future. This will be a matter of finding methods where it is possible, following democratic social decisions, to prevent, say, the introduction of new technologies which cannot be controlled with certainty in terms of their ecological effects, even in cases where such technologies might result in prosperity from the standpoint of efficiency and profit. No unequivocal response has yet been found to this question, not even in developed industrial countries of the West.
- In the sphere of international (world) interaction of societies emerging from the system of "real socialism." The concern here is the type of role these societies will continue to play in determining the method of solving international conflicts (particularly, the concern will be the decline of the significance of the military factor) and in solving some global problems of development involving contemporary civilization, particularly in regard to the so-called Third World.

I believe that it is possible to visualize fairly specific conflicts in all of these areas between capitalist and socialist trends in the development of a modern industrial society. Which of these trends will achieve hegemony in solving the above problems—this is the question of the possibilities at the disposal of leftist alternative development. The leftist alternative, thus, does not deny the necessity for the entry of the capitalist trend into the societies of former "real socialism" (that is to say, it does not oppose the introduction of a market for products, labor, and capital). However, it strives for its own solution to the above-mentioned questions in such a way as to subordinate the capitalist trend to the control of society. I consider the principal guarantee for

achieving hegemony of the socialist kind (one that controls and restricts capitalism) to be the evolution of a structured civil society in such a form in which social entities (large social groupings, but also worker collectives and individuals) who have hitherto lived in non-capitalist social structures could have the opportunity to articulate their interests and needs and to express their interests in socially and politically relevant form, even by criticizing capital.

A Defense of the Third Way?

An excessive and sometimes exclusionary emphasis on the development of a multiparty system as the decisive and exclusive direction in the development of democracy has a one-sided effect under the conditions which exist in the countries of the former "real socialism." Preferential treatment is accorded to interests which differentiate people according to ideological criteria (particularly into two opposing "camps"; noncommunists versus communists), by nationality, according to religion, and general value orientations, according to regional interests, etc. The interests and needs of people according to their categorization within the work process, as producers (having a different position in the division of labor) as well as in the form of consumers, as labor for hire as well as in the form of representatives of enterprise collectives, etc., remain in the background and unrepresented.

In other words: A person who is socially classified (limited in his opportunities, frequently unequal to other people) is forced out of politics as a result of his own abstract image in which he appears as a citizen, equal with respect to his political rights with the other citizens. However, both with respect to its historical origin and also in terms of his actual political function, this opens room particularly for the application of the capitalist tendency in modern societies, but it suppresses the opportunities for the political functioning of those tendencies which are opposed to capitalism. In the interest of the specific application of these tendencies, it is necessary to accord preferential treatment to the self-administration of socially defined people and to develop this as an independently serious factor in the political system and to do so along both of the lines of the everyday life of these people; along the lines of the worker collectives, in which these people spend the overwhelming portion of their lives, and along the lines of self-administration in the communities (cities, territorial regions), in which they live for the remainder of the day.

The socially defined majority of society (people who work for wages in the most varied areas) should decide for themselves what fundamental changes they consider to be correct, and to what extent and at what pace, and which are responsive to their needs and interests.

In the current political atmosphere in the countries examined, it can be merely proclaimed, without the need to present argumentation, that such a view represents a defense of the so-called third way which has shown itself to be inappropriate, impossible, and unrealistic. It is said that this is "reform-communist thinking." I respond: yes and no. I really believe that development forward from "real socialism" will not be and cannot be a mere denial, rejection, of many decades of noncapitalist development (perhaps with a certain exception of the special situation in Germany). However, this does not mean the preservation and development of the wreckage of the failed "real socialism," but it means seeing that development following this failure nevertheless begins on a differing social basis from that which is ongoing in the West.

Efforts to achieve qualitative changes cannot exclude reformist approaches—just like they are not excluded in the West. However, socialist reformism pertaining to these conditions is essentially tied through its umbilical cord to so-called reform communism, something which is equally valid for any possible "social democratic" political stream in these countries.

It remains a historical fact that authentic attempts at achieving qualitative changes in the Stalinist system—in the postwar period, this occurred in Yugoslavia in 1950, in Hungary and Poland in 1958, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and again in Poland in 1980—always made it one of their primary demands to call for access to the political decisionmaking process for socially designated people working for wages in noncapitalist enterprises. The demands for one or another form of self-administration for worker collectives always stood in the forefront. None of these attempts proved realizable either because they were violently suppressed (be it with the assistance of Soviet intervention or without it, as was the case in Poland in 1981) or because, in the final analysis, they were not accompanied by the breaking up of the monopoly power wielded by the Communist Party and by the strong elements of the administrative bureaucratic management of the economy (Yugoslavia). An attempt which would simultaneously take the road of a parliamentary type of political democracy, given a dominating role of the market rather than the dominating role of state direction—such an attempt has not yet been made.

My consideration regarding the necessity for a leftist alternative development in the social systems of onetime "real socialism" is not based on an effort to defend, at any price, at least something of the concepts of the 1960's with which I am closely connected as a result of my personal history. I much more likely base my considerations on the experiences which I have lived through and which I did not work out ideologically until later, in the West, toward the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's. This experience demonstrates that even the currently most advanced industrial civilizations of the West, in which hegemony has retained its capitalist tendencies, engender their own critical situations for the foreseeable future. Primarily, they are not

capable from the standpoint of their current quality of integrating the entire so-called Third World, that is to say, the absolute majority of mankind. The current developed Western industrial society, which exists in some privileged countries, is not a fortuitously discovered solution for the living perspectives of several billion people. Thus, the majority of mankind is constantly confronted with the problem of its own future as though it were facing an unanswered question. Secondly, the current form of Western civilization is not capable of assuring both its own existing economic-technical pace and, at the same time, safeguarding the essential ecological conditions of life on earth (and this includes not only people).

It is primarily these two giant problems which it will be necessary to resolve satisfactorily on the way to a postindustrial civilization. Along this path, the countries in which so-called real socialism has failed are contributing indisputable negative experiences: They have demonstrated through their practices what kind of a system constitutes a blind alley for the future. However, if the giant sacrifices made by the people of these countries are not to have only this "deterrent" significance, the leftist forces of these countries should at least be seeking specific experiences and opportunities for solving overall civilizational problems of the present as well as of the future.

Deputy Suspects StB of Disinformation Activity

91CH0312A Prague OBCANSKY DENIK in Czech
26 Jan 91 p 11

[Unattributed article: "An StB [State Security] Confidant in Action?"]

[Text] "Czechoslovakia is not threatened by either a constitutional or a governmental crisis. The Interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right (MKDP) has expressed its support to Premier Calfa, to Minister Dlouhy, and others. Reports of alleged efforts to express a lack of confidence in the government are considered by MKDP as deliberate disinformation, as efforts by certain components of Civic Forum who feel threatened within the movement, to cast the Democratic Right in an unfavorable light and to accuse it of striving for destabilization in this country."

This was stressed by the chairman of the MKDP, Federal Assembly Deputy Daniel Kroupa. In response to speculation that Jan Carnogursky should become the premier, Daniel Kroupa stated that Jan Carnogursky as premier of the federal government would be absolutely unacceptable for the democratic right wing of Civic Forum. "From this, it is clear" remarked the chairman of the Interparliamentary Club, "the group of deputies which were allegedly supposed to strive to express a lack of confidence in the government could not have come from the MKDP."

"I believe," he said, "that some items of information can have their origin among former confidants of the StB

[State Security]." He referred the request for specific names to the results of the screenings.

Daniel Kroupa continued by saying that our goal is definitely not destabilization, nor the recall of the federal government. He said that the MKDP only reserved the right to criticize individual ministers, as part of the duties of a deputy. For example, Deputy Bratinka criticized Minister Dienstbier for his ministry being a "bailiff for some Communist states" until December 1990.

D. Kroupa also stressed that the MKDP is not even striving to have the Czech Government recalled. The reconstruction of the Presidium of the Czech National Council took place following an agreement between MKDP and the Liberal Club of Civic Forum. "We regret," Daniel Kroupa said, "that the representatives of the Liberal Club did not adhere to the agreement during voting, but we do not draw any other conclusions from this fact.

"I consider the fact that the president was informed of the alleged efforts by MKDP in an unfavorable light to be extremely nonserious. At that, those who informed him had every opportunity of verifying all data by consulting with the leading representatives of MKDP," D. Kroupa concluded.

Further Details on Tension Within Civic Forum

91CH0321A Prague OBCANSKY DENIK in Czech
29 Jan 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Daniel Kroupa by Karel Stanek; place and date not given: "A Joke Turned Into a Scandal?"—first and last paragraphs are OBCANSKY DENIK commentary]

[Text] Early Wednesday morning Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus called Daniel Kroupa, the chairman of the Interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right, to inquire what the deputies of his club in the parliament were up to. Were they really going to call for a vote of no confidence in the government, and why? Already on Thursday the story appeared in newspapers, mentioning Carnogursky as the new premier as well as new appointees to four ministerial posts. Friday afternoon Minister Klaus characterized all that as amusing mystification, but that same afternoon the deputy chairman of the parliament, Zdenek Jicinsky, said the same thing about the words of V. Klaus.

[Stanek] The attack on our government was believed to originate in actions of the deputies in the Interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right. What does Daniel Kroupa think about that?

[Kroupa] I have no inkling about any of that, except perhaps that Deputy Premier Rychetsky let out the first "genie" when he speculated that a split of the Civic Forum might cast doubts on the mandate of the deputies from the Civic Forum. Already during U.S. President Bush's visit here various stories began leaking out. At

that time I went to see Premier Calfa who was afraid that he would not have our support; I assured him that he had it and would have it in the future.

[Stanek] Nevertheless this week the whole affair assumed a very concrete form with Mr. Carnogursky as the premier.

[Kroupa] We are for the federative system of the republic and from the moment when Mr. Carnogursky declared that he would accept the federative principle for the time being he became unacceptable to us.

[Stanek] Where do you see the source of the whole scandal about the show of no confidence?

[Kroupa] I don't know; I tried my best to find out but I really don't know. Someone may have seen its motivation in the criticism of Deputy Bratinka. Last December he learned that we were not permitting citizens from the communist countries to travel to West Europe if they did not have approval from their embassies. Therefore, he said that our Foreign Ministry acted as a henchman for East Europe. He did not receive any satisfactory explanation, but that order was later rescinded.

[Stanek] This scandal does not cast a favorable light on your club or on the Civic Forum....

[Kroupa] That is hardly the first attempt to portray us as a destabilizing element. But we are not satisfied with certain things. After the debate on new procedural rules we shall demand Mr. Jicinsky's resignation in view of the reconstruction of the presidium of the Federal Assembly.

[Stanek] Why?

[Kroupa] Because of the way he conducts some of the debates in the parliament.

[Stanek] You said that it was not the first time your club was portrayed as a destabilizing element....

[Kroupa] We ignored many remarks—about the brown shirts, or about the gleam in Sladek's eyes. But now they have gone too far, and I am extremely sorry about the information given to the president. The report that we wanted Mr. Carnogursky for premier in itself demonstrated a malicious intent, especially because he is so unpopular in Bohemia.

[Stanek] Now you are talking about a specific report....

[Kroupa] I mean the report by the Czechoslovak Press Agency [CTK]. When I asked the CTK reporter for the names of the deputies who had discussed the expression of no confidence in our government, he mentioned, among others, the name of one informer.

[Stanek] Do you think that this is intentional, possibly a well premeditated "leak" of the rumor about the expression of no confidence in the government?

[Kroupa] I believe that someone found it quite convenient, and that particular individual supported it.

[Stanek] But the CTK reporter told you the name of the author.

[Kroupa] I discussed that with them. One rejected it categorically, another said that he said jokingly in the lobby of the parliament for his own amusement that perhaps there should be a vote of no confidence in the government because of what was going on with the draft of the law on restitution. Otherwise all from our club whose names were mentioned rejected it as nonsense and slander. After Minister Klaus called me Wednesday I personally approached Deputy Benda; he had not the faintest idea about all of that. In addition, I telephoned J. Sokol, the chairman of the club of Civic Forum deputies; neither did he know a thing, except for some hearsay that the deputies had been cracking some jokes in the lobby of the parliament.

[Stanek] So a little joke has turned into a scandal about no confidence for the whole world to hear? According to D. Kroupa, Minister Klaus learned about it at a government meeting and President Havel mentioned it in his broadcast "Talks from Lany." However, on Monday D. Kroupa spoke with Minister Dlouhy and assured him that the Interparliamentary Club would fully support him, despite certain points of disagreement with the deputies of the club. Thus, as soon as early last week the information was circulating that a vote of no confidence might be in the air. Last Friday it was confirmed by Deputy Premier Pavel Rychetsky.

[Kroupa] I learned about it before the emergency meeting of the government when the changes in the draft of the law on restitution were discussed. I do not agree with the reports in today's papers.

[Stanek] Last Friday the deputy chairman of the parliament, Zdenek Jicinsky, stated that he had quite specific information that certain deputies from the Interparliamentary Club of the Democratic Right had discussed potential appointees to certain ministerial posts. Can you, Mr. Deputy Premier, tell us more about such allegations?

[Kroupa] Occasionally one happens to come upon some information but it would not be proper to disclose it right away.

[Stanek] Could you at least share with us the source of your information or some kind of confirmation?

[Kroupa] After some delay I learned that also one of the deputies had supposedly said that. As far I am concerned, I talked about it in more or less abstract terms only after the president had mentioned it in his "Talks from Lany."

[Stanek] It seems that it is rather difficult to get to the root of the rumors about the vote of no confidence in our government (which was supposed to take place today, Tuesday). Apparently, there are some correlations with the internal controversies in the Civic Forum and with

its transformation into a political party. And unfortunately, it appears nearly impossible that a desirable settlement and reconciliation, however fragile they may be, would still occur. Nevertheless, Zdenek Jicinsky refuses to accept any such impossibility.

[Kroupa] Strike out the impossible. I am not one of those who are not interested in cooperation.

Our domestic political situation is quite unstable, almost vulnerable. It is almost enough if someone, even a practically anonymous individual, says something, or one of the deputies cracks a joke in the lobby of the parliament. At this time we have too much at stake, and therefore, it is highly desirable for the Civic Forum to stop being so introverted and for the time being to set its internal problems aside, and continue to be a positive, decisive and inspiring political force that can deal with the impact of our domestic and foreign problems.

Slovaks Subservient to Czechs Criticized

9ICH0283A Bratislava LITERARNY TYZDENNIK
in Slovak 21 Dec 90 p 13

[Article by Vladimir Minac]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Some Slovak intellectuals do not engage in polemics but in outright hate; for generations, in festering hate, they have not been listening to the other side for fear that they might by chance understand. Hate is being cultivated and fertilized like tomatoes. Political straitjackets, herd mentality instead of individuality, a bazaar of banalities, well, forget it!

National culture is moribund: But who needs national culture? The nation will once again be a nation of seasonal laborers, and beautiful girls will become badly paid prostitutes; but what is the nation good for? A large part of Slovak intelligentsia has deserted the nation and is full of indignation that the flag-wavers have taken control of it.

Events in Prague

In Prague, at the intersection of Perlova Street, Rytirska Street, and Uhelny Trh Square is a small St. Pauli; small, but it is Prague's, it is ours. It is the place of proletarian prostitutes, those, who stand on the lowest rung of a widespread, and socially, and therefore also economically, diverse enterprise—from a grand 500 German marks to a pitiful 100 Czech korunas. In this proletarian area business is still conducted on one's own, as a small private enterprise so to speak, without taxi drivers, receptionists, or other entrepreneurs in the business, it is done in the recesses of courtyards and under archways, quickly and without hygiene; here Klaus' magic formula that in a market economy price is determined by agreement between supplier and customer is already functioning; and in this proletarian zone, where old hags, housewives, and utter greenhorns from the country work, Prague reporters noticed a Slovak girl just like a rose, young and tempting, but still a beginner in the

business, yet already known in the neighborhood for her youth and beauty, and especially for her original slogan: "For a hundred pieces by hand or by mouth".

"Oh, that Slovak language, that sacred language, I know, it indeed is not a language of world renown," Heyduk once mistakenly said, but is Slovak not a language of world renown? And in the middle of Europe, on its very navel?

Neither the premier, Mr. Calfa, nor the deputy premier, Mr. Miklosko, nor the other ministers in the federal government work on Rytirska Street, to be sure, and perhaps their pure Slovak souls have never heard of it. Well, they have something in common with that lovely girl, who probably went there to earn money for her trousseau: They and 20,000 others belong in the category of Prague Slovaks.

What Is a Prague Slovak?

From the socioeconomic point of view, it is clear: He is a citizen of the Slovak Republic who earns more in Prague than he could anywhere in Slovakia. As far as political power is concerned, to date a Prague Slovak has had more political influence and direct power as a reporter than a minister in Bratislava. A Prague Slovak occupies positions which have been traditionally assigned to Prague Slovaks, he is entitled to them above all by common law—and this entitlement extends mostly to positions abroad as well, and so it goes.

A Prague Slovak is a modernized client [in ancient Rome, a dependent living under the patronage of a patrician].

Already in ancient Rome—well, what can you do?—already in ancient Rome there were masters and there were clients—apart from the people. The clients were mostly parasites, physicians who no longer healed because their hands trembled when they performed the favorite bloodletting, Greek teachers who never taught, bootlickers and back stabbers, professional flatterers and gossip mongers, pilferers and voyeurs who peered through all the crevices during their masters' revelries—at that time, I suspect, keyholes. But they were also in their own way advisers, expert intriguers and insinuators, rulers over their masters' weaknesses and therefore also over their masters; their humble position was obvious, their true power was concealed but acknowledged; it resembled the power of today's bureaucracy. In exceptional cases the clients became masters, and in the twilight of the empire also rulers.

In more recent times, a variation of that clientele supported the British Empire, for whose powerful justice the iron lady shed tears from deep within her democratic personality even in our parliament, forgetting to add that in the foundations of that democratic empire they buried slaughtered nations from all over the planet. British clients, the selected and bought intelligentsia from the subjugated nations, helped to divide and rule, and it was precisely through the compradors' intelligentsia that the

British controlled large nations and areas with only small armies; a few operations by the artillery sufficed to hold huge China in bondage.

The Prague Slovak was evolving, he was changing not only his appearance but also his substance. If a pre-World War I Prague Slovak in Detvana used to dream about a cultural and political alliance with the Czechs as a condition for Slovak freedom, if from the Prague experience arose such figures as Mr. Matej Bencur or Milan Rastislav Stefanik or Messrs. Makovicky and Skvaran, if we think about the role which Prague and Prague Slovaks played in the development of modern Slovak literature and arts between the two World Wars, if we think about the contemporary editorial activity of Chrobak and Smrek (under the auspices of the first sponsor of modern Slovak literature, thanks to you, Mr. Mazac!), if we think at the same time of the high educational level in Prague as it is documented by the Davists as well as by the last Prague "Matuska" generation, then we must admit that a Prague Slovak of this kind was good seed material for the nation, one of the sources of modern Slovak thinking, such Prague Slovak was obviously accustomed to European yeast in Slovak dough.

At the moment when the captive Czech nation became a ruling nation, at that very moment a Slovak clientele appeared in Prague. If before World War I Srobar, Blaho, and Derer were followers of Masaryk's ideas and also to some extent his Slovak partners, after the Czechoslovak Republic came into being they became clients, who in a servile, resigned, and not entirely selfless manner helped the ruling nation to divide and dominate a nonruling and powerless nation.

Bribery brings results: Cooperate and you will be paid. The Prague Slovaks went on the offensive, but what were we fighting for? For the residual estates created by land reform, for executive boards, for royalties, for positions, the high and the highest! The career of Milan Hodza is typical: from a fiery and energetic deputy to the Pest parliament, through a long, irreversible, and slow fall all the way to the chair of the premier, an unimportant official of the Castle and the Agrarian Party.

Ever since then, for long decades, the clientele grew, it kept elaborating the rules of the game, again clients became power brokers, premiers, even presidents; the Prague clientele was shamelessly helping to rule the Slovak province, until the present, until Marian Calfa's time.

A man is born not free, but becomes a client by his own decision. A Prague Slovak has today, as he always had, a single duty; to be a unitarist and a centralist, a professional Czechoslovak; that is not a matter of character, that is the character of the matter.

From the moral viewpoint it really does not matter whether a client is after a crumb from the master's table or the entire table; true, politically each client carries different weight. When Mr. Calfa's East Slovakian knees

buckled under the pressure of the united Prague right, he poured out his triune federal soul in an cunningly timed television speech. What love the nonnative Praguers showered on him! LIDOVE NOVINY, which managed to sing his praises so quickly that in our times it is something to marvel at, celebrated him as an energetic savior of the homeland; an indivisible Czechoslovak, that is, a Czech homeland. Suddenly it was forgotten (for the moment—let Mr. Calfa learn that later) that he served the former regime heart and soul, to the last second so to speak, and in the end he did not change his view, in Jakes's time as well as now, in the time of the Czechoslovak right, he is defending triunity. A triune constitution, a triune nation; something monstrous is being born here. Some Slovak newspapers have already encouraged such a move when they wrote favorably about the birth of a federal nation. This numerically small, badly concealed, but extremely ambitious, perfidious and powerful group lives entrenched in Prague's ruling circles, from where it heaps lies on its own nation. A Czech in the federal-Czechoslovak position is somehow in his own power posture: He cowers before those more powerful, rules over the weaker ones. But how does a Slovak look there? The current deputy premier of the federal government, member of the Christian Democratic Movement, defends in the parliament on our behalf unacceptable ideas and institutions so brazenly that people who voted for him—if, of course, they knew about it—would at home chase him from town and village, from church and tavern.

The ideal of a client is service, his goal personal benefit, his means betrayal of national interests. For more than 70 years nothing has changed in this respect, only masters and their clients have changed. And we shall not do well unless we get these fleas out of our coats, if we do not erase from the national psyche the inclination toward servility. When the Slovak National Party people came up with that somewhat comical motto that Slovaks should stand on their own feet—for goodness sake, what else should they be standing on?—first of all, the servant, the serf, with all his servile demeanor which is as if imbedded in our genes, must stand up on his own feet. After all, throughout history we always felt closer to real servants than to masters; it is as if morally, or rather, immorally, servitude were merely the continuation of the real, the sociohistorical. (After all, even Count Jan Karol Schwarzenberg is what he is thanks to specific historical Slovak servitude: It appears that he was weaned by a Slovak wet nurse from the Myjava hills. What luck that in the body of such a distinguished person flows Slovak milk!)

Slovak servility is disgusting; only the parvenu Slovak thickheadedness is more disgusting still. This either/or is an onerous spectre of Slovak life with which it is impossible to become reconciled.

Germany's Stellar Time

The Mala Strana quarter in Prague has problems with the small privatization. It is a neighborhood of retired

senior citizens, and senior citizens are more or less neglected in the monetary plans of Mr. Klaus; they will not have the means to pay the increased rentals to the new or old-new landlords. Some social demagogue described the whole problem in the press as if it were goodness knows what. But after all, in New York itself there are 60,000 homeless people and they are not complaining; there is no reason why Neruda's question should appear in a new guise. What to do with them? [reference to poet Jan Neruda, who lived in Mala Strana, and his short story about disposing of an old straw mattress] After all, in Mala Strana there are relatively more public restrooms than in the center of Manhattan, where there are only eight. And finally, if the senior citizen has at least a little decency, he will hurry up and die.

People are saying that many of the new owners will be the old Germans from Prague or their heirs. True, the esteemed premier of the federal government insisted during discussions with the representatives of the formidable Landsmannschaft that we shall not go further back than 1948 with restitutions, but how many things he has already insisted on, and how few of them have come true!

Because the defeated now finally won: they have the rights of the victor, and that is always cruel. The Bohemian basin lies here naked, impoverished, and surrounded, again surrounded. There is no need to fight for the territory, it can be bought.

[The Swiss dramatist] Friedrich Durrenmatt wrote at the time of the German unification: "German politicians already speak the word Europe with the same reverence as the word fatherland." Homeland, your stars, Europe, your stars, today Europe is ours, and so on: Mr. Durrenmatt was a Swiss in his thinking rather than a German, but he knew the Germans, even when they speak nice words. Truly, Germans did not cease to be Germans but Europe is ceasing to be European; it is becoming German. It is stellar hour, Germany's stellar time, which seems permanent from today's vantage point; it grew out of German strength, perseverance, diligence, and from the fateful historical errors in Teheran, in Yalta, in Potsdam, and the consequent tragedy of East Europe.

A new imbalance is just beginning: If a British minister protests, he has to go; even the iron lady left in tears, chased out by the power of an absolute victor. France has its nuclear umbrella, but it is a very dangerous protective shield.

Europe will be supranational. Above all nations will be the Germans.

And then what about us, with our bare backs and our qualms, what about the Bohemian basin? St. Ludmila and St. Wenceslas, where shall we get 400 oxen year after year? [reference to a tribute paid by Bohemia to Germany during the reign of Wenceslas in the 10th century] What I want to say is, how shall we pay interest and

interest on interest? Are we again going to be servants of something that it apart and above us, again tinkers in some other guise?

To finish what I started—a few thoughts about sorrow. Sorrow is not a matter of calculated decision, or a matter of faith or trust: It is a matter of experience and learning.... "At that time" wrote Nikos Kazantzakis, "I lost forever the naive trust of a child in the world. Now I knew that the sky is black chaos, silent and indifferent. My soul could no longer accept the solace of pleasant and unmanly hopes. With slow and uncertain steps I moved closer to the precipice. But my eyes were not trained well enough, and I did not have the courage to look directly into it." And those who have the courage, let them not look too often. And those who do not want to, cannot, or do not know how, let them better walk a little farther away, let them strengthen their muscles, they will need them; let them live their lives with half-closed eyes, who knows, maybe it is even better that way. And all in all, it is certainly more expedient.

VPN Seen as Only Guarantee of Reform's Success

91CH0305A Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Slovak
23 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Pavel Hoffman: "Under Pressure of Responsibility"]

[Text] When contemplating the Slovak political scene, we cannot talk about a left and a right, that is, about a traditional political spectrum. Competing here with each other are a national orientation and a liberal democratic orientation. Supporters and members of the Public Against Violence [VPN] have been gradually coming closer together on the position that there are no national or nonnational subjects; there are only different concepts of how to formulate what is national. Fedor Gal says on this point: "We are citizens and we are Slovaks. There is no sense in establishing the priority of one or the other."

The VPN has the largest plurality of all the other parties in Slovakia (and today also in Czechoslovakia). How is the VPN platform defined? Fedor Gal mentions the following three characteristics: "Dialogue, search for consensus, participation." One of the features of VPN orientation is the fact that in contrast with the Civic Forum [OF], where the strong-willed minister of finance is at the same time the head of that party, in VPN the cooperation of the two strong personalities at the head of the Slovak Government and at the head of the VPN is a guarantee that a similar concentration of power will not occur. Some articles in the press which predicted such an outcome, that is, that Vladimir Meciar will become the VPN chairman, were totally rejected by the Slovak Premier on 19 January in Casta, when he said: "Someone is forever announcing a conflict between me and Gal.... We found an ideal way for government and a political movement to coexist. We cooperate perfectly. We engage in discussions, and we respect each other. The government is not creating a power center."

The VPN representatives are of the opinion that their movement is the only guarantee of the reform's success in Slovakia, because all the other parties and movements have, in comparison to it, an inclination toward a leftist or a nationalist populism. Frantisek Miklosko: "If the VPN changes into a populist movement, then there will be only populist movements competing among themselves." Therefore the VPN considers it necessary to maintain its own profile if it is to prevent a catastrophe in Slovakia. It is a paradox which is being pointed out by VPN ministers (Kucerak, Ondrus) that criticism of the reform from the rightist point of view is absent in the Slovak press. Even the government daily NARODNA OBRODA criticizes the reform that is being implemented by the government exclusively from the leftist point of view. "Where are all those enemies of socialism all of a sudden?" asks J. Kucerak.

If I were to express my personal opinion why a marked consolidation and acceptance of responsibility for the future development of society is occurring in the VPN just at this time, I would say that besides the tensions in the Middle East and the USSR, it is because of the breakup of the OF which is taking place. If the skeptical prediction that the OF with its 10,000 members will become a useful but not very important political force, the VPN will bear a much greater share of responsibility than it had until now. And not only for the fate of Slovakia but also for the fate of Czechoslovakia.

1st Volume of Jozef Tiso's Biography Praised

91CH0309A Bratislava *BRATISLAVSKE LISTY*
in Slovak No 1, 1991 pp 8-9

[Article by Edo Gombala: "Historical Truth—What Is Your Actual Character?"]

[Text] At the end of 1989, when we were trembling at home with regard to the fate of our revolution, the first part of the biography of Dr. Jozef Tiso was published in Italy (*Jozef Tiso—Slovak Priest and Statesman 1887-1939*). The biography was written by Slovak exile historian Milan S. Durica.

To pretend that this book was not known in Slovakia and that the facts contained in it have not penetrated into the consciousness of at least tens (possibly hundreds) of Slovak readers would be tantamount to hiding one's head in the sand like an ostrich. The book is certainly at the disposal of our professional historians, who will have to use it to arrive at appropriate conclusions based on it, primarily for themselves and, then, even for this nation which rightfully expects its historians to present the unvarnished and undistorted truth and only the truth; the truth about even the most complicated periods of its own past, even if that truth will not always be in complete agreement with hitherto established findings by historians or with the not overly competent utterances of politicians.

The fact that the book exists takes on special significance and leads to possible consideration of it even in terms of

a special coloration of the background of the well-known events which took place at Banovce, which provided the impetus for the pronunciation of a mass of contradictory views. The majority of them were directly drowned in the morass of subjectivist ignorance which was not infrequently replete with a priori invectives of the most varied types. It is a pity that we could not all have had access to Durica's book. We could have felt as if we were at the beginning of a process in which, following the inevitable and necessary passage of time, we could have, objectively and without any kind of outside political and ideological pressure, without any one-sided partiality, shed some light on even the most complicated stages of our national development.

As a nation, we probably have no other opportunity, no other starting point for our continued existence in time than the strictest, most objective, and most truthful truth regarding our own past, which cannot and must not get by without monitoring and taking into account the conditions of the time as inseparable components of historical facts. Only in this manner can we subject ourselves to historical repentance, obtain satisfaction, ask for the forgiveness of sins, achieve forgiveness, and continue on our path with a clear conscience.

However, morality and morale (of the individual as well as of the nation) does not require the taking on of a greater load of guilt than is appropriate. The individual as well as the nation has the right and even the duty to object if anyone for any reason ascribes a greater measure of guilt to him or it than that which actually exists. This finding takes on special importance in a situation in which, as members of a nation, we feel that someone is again attempting to utilize and abuse the totality of our putative and exaggerated guilts to our detriment, to once more weigh us down with their weight so that, even in a more relaxed situation, we should not raise our head excessively. It is paradoxical to see how we ourselves tend to join the ranks of our ill-wishers out of ignorance or because of some other personal or group bias and how we strive to put ourselves in the position into which others wish to place us quite willfully.

The author of the book conceived of it in strictly historical terms—that is to say, that he documents all of his contingents with care and almost with anxiety, being aware of the natural political sensitivity of the topic. The personality of the Slovak priest and nationalist as well as political activist is understood by Durica as being uniquely positive although he personally handled the problem of evaluating J. Tiso as controversial in the introduction of the book. For purposes of this piece of information, we lack the opportunity of verifying for ourselves the extent to which Professor Durica made use or did not make use of historical documents casting a shadow over Tiso which could have been the germ of the black cloud of Fascist evil surrounding this Slovak priest-politician. We only state the undocumented assumption that in conceiving the biography, even Durica paid a certain percentage of his taxes based on his personal relationship with Tiso, much the same as the

majority of historians would have paid in this case in either a positive or a negative direction (admiration or negation).

For the impartial reader, Durica's biography of J. Tiso makes convincing reading. The book provides the reader with facts which have hitherto been inaccessible, suppressed, or knowingly distorted, deformed, and abused from the propaganda standpoint. These facts have held a nation on a short leash—a nation which was unable to make too many political leaps precisely because of those "condemnation-worthy" facts which originated with it or at least with a major part of it. It was this past which lent itself very comfortably to a struggle against a feared ideological opponent, not to mention that the deformed facts served to divide the nation which could, thus, be more easily governed.

It is natural that Durica, in following the individual phases of Tiso's life devotes the most attention to his political activities. He follows his political path and the creation of the Slovak concept of his policies from the standpoint of a parliamentary deputy and a member of the Czechoslovak Government, step by step. In analyzing Tiso's views, he emphasizes his sense for social questions and lists the methods used in their solution. According to Durica's interpretation of facts, Tiso stood opposed to the centralism of the Prague government with the total weight of his personality. His struggle for the autonomy of Slovakia, however, was a struggle for a single Czechoslovak state containing two nations having equal rights. Tiso's theory of a modern Slovak nation was supposed to be a countervailing force against the political Czechoslovakism emanating from Prague. From today's point of view, when efforts are under way to create an authentic federation, the efforts for autonomy made at that time remind us of current efforts in many aspects. "Neither Hlinka nor Tiso had in mind the destruction of the republic," contends Professor Durica. Anyone who at that time was afraid of Slovak autonomy was actually afraid for their power positions.

Durica's findings and statements regarding Tiso's political actions in conjunction with the proclamation of the Slovak state are also interesting. Certainly, the Slovak state came into being under political pressure. There was no other, better opportunity. However, Tiso maintained legality with respect to the proclamation of that state. The decision regarding the Slovak state was made by ballot in the Slovak Assembly. In his broadcast speech, which Durica cites in toto, Tiso proclaimed Christian love and rejected any kind of hatred as the principal component of his political program. In so doing, he did not kowtow to the Germans and did not show any kind of servility with respect to Hitler.

What then, is the historical truth? The truth of Durica, documented with facts, or the a priori truth which has penetrated our consciousness like a malignant tumor and which continues to be presented to Slovaks by those in power? Whether we like it or not, we must admit that the first part of Durica's monograph represents the most

comprehensive view of Tiso's personality through 1939 which exists in current Slovak historiography.

The Slovak reader (and not only the Slovak reader) who gets his hands on Durica's book and who reads it without prejudice can do nothing other than accept its truth. If someone else wishes to present him with another truth, that person would have to prove the untruthfulness of Durica. Perhaps he might even be successful with respect to individual facts, but it is very likely that sufficient facts will prevail in the book to prove that, until 1939, Dr. Jozef Tiso was an important and positive personality in Slovak history.

Background of Moravian Autonomy Drive Analyzed

91CH0319A Prague *LIDOVE NOVINY* in Czech
29 Jan 91 p 9

[Article by Petr Prikoda: "The Great Dream of Moravia"]

[Text] There had always been slight differences between the Czechs and the Moravians. However, a relatively new phenomenon is the emphasis on Moravian patriotism that sometimes acts offended and sometimes is aggressive, but always proclaims how distinctive the Moravian character is or how it differs from the Czechs from Bohemia. During the first republic it was unknown, and the Protectorate and the post-February terror brought both ways of self-realization rather closer. As for myself, I began to observe the genesis of Moravian self-emphasis only as the harsh repressions were beginning to abate in the early 1950's, in other words, some time after the death of Stalin and Gottwald (1953). Until that time the manipulated part of our nation had cheered in Moravia as much as in Bohemia, while the other, the browbeaten part remained silent in the former as in the latter region. The thaw in the mid-1950's enabled the internal emigres to catch their breath a bit and straighten up their spine cautiously. A glimmer of hope began to dawn after the 20th CPSU Congress. Its public expression was the Second Congress of the Czechoslovak Writers Association (spring 1956). Following the defeat of the Hungarian revolution, depression prevailed but it could not reach again the depth of the preceding period.

The inertia continued; personnel officers continued personnel screening; informers continued to report on people, but there were no more executions. Although Communism seemed to be advancing and although no one in his right mind expected to live long enough to see that darkness come to an end, another feeling beside depression was coming to the surface: humiliation. Especially among the younger generation, and with it the effort to stand up and protest somehow against that miserable existence. At that time it was a sporadic effort that did not call for changes anywhere but in the world of one's subjective experience. By that I mean the browbeaten part of our nation. It was a different story with the one that initially used to stand up and cheer; some

individuals in that group were already beginning to dream about political changes, of course, those implemented by the CPCZ [Czechoslovak Communist Party], but distrust continued and the two parts had little communication with each other.

At that time among the politically unaffiliated Moravian intellectuals and students, and I was one of them, I witnessed the birth of the Great Dream of Moravia. What straw was there to grasp, if we wanted to distance ourselves from the general misery? The idea of Moravian nationalism, a maternal archetype, was on hand: We are no part of such conditions and neither is our ravished Mother Moravia. The evil was coming from somewhere else. We are and always have been different, since the days of Cyril and Methodius.

We gazed at our dream world and refused to notice many things, for instance, how our zealous and servile district satraps were boasting about their Moravian identity; how the proverbial Moravian conviviality helped cover up opportunistic relations; how the cymbal bands played and our boys proudly displayed their national costumes mainly at the First of May parades and similar occasions. If you permit me to borrow Jiri Hanak's words, I would say that, in brief, we refused to see how our dearest Mother Moravia had ensconced herself cozily in the anus of the more powerful Mother Party.

Our Moravian patriotism was something like a neurotic complex. It was an attempt at escapist identity. I am not making fun of it. Self-preservation always is a serious matter. However, in this case it had opted for a dubious means, namely, a fantastic plan. That involved certain risks. We failed to realize that what we wanted to avoid was ordinary provincialism. We could not recognize that and therefore, we fell for it so much harder.

Then in 1968 I sensed that some of my peers wished to bring our Great Dream to life. And then a new humiliation occurred, but once the deceptive attempt at self-preservation begins, it strikes also the next generation. I think that I am not much mistaken: In the current militant Moravian regionalism I see the continuation of somewhat older fantasies; they did not merge with political ambitions previously but now they do because that is now possible.

The Moravian movement today profits from the more common dissatisfaction; in real socialism we were nothing, so let us be something more. A verse of the Internationale expresses the same drive. Its very embodiment is the kingfish of the Moravian movement. That ambitious old man with beady eyes had never before distinguished himself either as a hero of the resistance or as a prominent figure in his field. Now he wants to be a leader.

The movement is indebted for its success in elections to disorientation: "I don't know whom to choose, so I'll vote for Moravia," said the confused voters from Brno and vicinity. Therefore, to this day it is obvious that

political prudence is not the greatest asset of the movement. Its spokesmen recite populist platitudes, stress how neglected Moravia is, and demand that such injustices be remedied, but they cannot come up with a plan as to how that could be done. Adherents of the movement who are members of the parliament and of the government have overcome their initial narrow views and learned to think more in political terms and bear responsibility. But that alienated them from their movement which does not want to know them, these "traitors."

The power of the movement rests today on the political ambitions of its activists; thus, because of their lack of political savvy they resemble certain callow zealots from the Civic Forum. Of course, they are using other ideological cliches and different rhetoric. The Movement for Self-Governing Democracy—Society for Moravia and Silesia [HSD-SMS] favors demagogues and that makes it probable that a truly political personality can grow in it. Moravia, whose specificity could be a welcome corrective for Bohemia and Prague, can hardly achieve any valuable gains by the action of a movement which may promote its interests but lacks the necessary credibility. This circumstance is important for the realization of a discouraging fact: Nothing like a Moravian political arena has been developed so far. Instead of supporting the process of refinement of views and unification of attitudes, the Moravians are turning reproachfully, or in anger, towards Prague. Moravia would benefit more if other political parties, including the Civic Forum, that is, its Moravian organizations, would promote her political interests and if they would learn, at least on the provincial level, to cooperate to the advantage of their land in a narrower sense of that word, if not for any other reason than that the provincial system is not just a Moravian problem.

Former Dissident on Social Attitudes, Mores

91CH0303A Prague TVORBA in Czech
29 Dec 90 pp 5-6

[Interview with Eva Kanturkova by Nada Klevisova and Zdenka Likarova; place and date not given: "To Rise Above One's Own Demons"—first paragraph is TVORBA introduction]

[Text] Now, when in theory everybody has the same chance to assert his or her talent without any ideological restrictions, the time has come for objective judgments—or rather, the time should be coming for objective criticism that will strictly and fairly treat both the "official" works and those created by our dissidents and exiles. That often requires turning the clock 40 years back.

[TVORBA] In your view, when will it be possible to reach an objective, unemotional assessment that does not see things only in black and white? Let us focus only on literature. Who may, and should, do the most in that particular area? What is the greatest obstacle there? How

can one prevent overestimating the mediocrity (for instance, the award given to Masa's film in Karlovy Vary)?

[Kanturkova] Your question is strangely construed. It is true that ideology hinders every sign of vitality in a talent, but can any judgment of literary criticism be objective? Do I really want criticism to strive for some kind of "objectivity"? Could not some very subjective individual use such (by whom?) authorized objectivity as a whip to lash artists and arts? What kind of criticism is "fair"? The one that sings my praises? Or the one that praises a different line than mine? Of course, I have an inkling about what you are driving at: Works that were either forbidden or created by emigres are now being touted; they are causing excitement and attracting interest, while authors who were permitted to publish are pushed into the background; but is precisely this not what fairness is all about? Is it not the reader's right finally to be able to read and learn some works that were forbidden under the totalitarian system? Criticism in this area reflects the period and fits squarely in the sum total of what is happening in our public life. As such, it could make erroneous evaluations of literary works, both in terms of admiration and condemnation; it is not the first time that literary criticism is in discord with genuine literary values. However, what more can you ask from a reflection of the period? Its outright prerogative is a certain characteristic of hustle and bustle, in other words, of a changeable spectrum. As for Masa's film, precisely there criticism seems to act more as a balancing factor, that is, official rating, of the festival. By pretending "objectivity" that criticism was very fierce, even ruthless. Already from those effects you can see that literary criticism cannot be objective because it reflects its era and acts to balance official judgments. It represents the critics' subjective input into public opinion and action.

However, our greatest wish should be that criticism be competent and perhaps also original. Criticism is important for literature; it puts individual works into the context of their times and artistic thought, which is quite essential after twenty years of silence both on the part of criticism and a major part of literature in our country. Nevertheless, that cannot be done by reviews alone, to which critics, with few exceptions, are inclined. First, the reviewer tends to tell us more about himself than about the work he reviews. I recall with gratitude our samizdat periodicals where the judgments of Milan Jungman, Jan Lopatka, Jan Trefulka, Milan Uhde, or Josef Kroutvor would occasionally stun me. I would include Bedrich Fucik, Vaclav Cerny and Jindrich Chalupecky among major critics of the generation that preceded us; their works demonstrate inventiveness that makes literary works complete and does not merely comment on them.

However, I will agree with you about certain things. I too am bothered by a certain tone of emotionalism in most of our criticism. Freedom came to us from above; according to our good Czech tradition, it gushed forth from underground, and then supersilence turned into

supercriticism. Critics also are subject to judgment, and if I consider the vicissitudes of their lives, a phenomenon of our times emerges: the loudest noise comes from individuals who bear the greatest shame for their silence. To outshout their own conscience, that is a psychological and not a political phenomenon as their shouting pretends to be; it is a process of purging oneself of totalitarianism, which all of us must undergo along with the loudmouths. Where would you want to look for objectivity in such cheap radical judgments? In this round-about way I want to repeat that criticism is an integral part of a living organism; it is closely connected with our times and acts accordingly. To push criticism toward "objectivity," that would paralyze it and prevent any revelation of things that must be revealed. By the same token, it may be natural for me to think that the spouting of gall, as some critics do, demonstrates a low degree of their professional qualities and their inability even to rise above their own demons. Only a self-confident personality does not see its criticism as its be-all and end-all and even manages to say something complimentary. Vaclav Cerny instilled in us the axiom that when a critic evaluates some work, his point of departure must not be his own conception of that particular work but the author's inner world; he must act as the author's external eye and recognize how the author in his work uses, or does not use, and develops, or fails to develop, his inherent potential. A critic who does not feel this humility before art should do something else to earn his living or he should be satisfied with being regarded as a mere literary kibitz.

I am taken aback most of all by the word "prevent" in your question. How in the world would you propose to prevent anything in the realm of views, and that is what criticism is all about. I may get engaged in polemics, oppose, argue, attack, I may do anything, but again only by way of expressing my views and publishing them. Only force, prohibition, ban on publication, shouting, or silencing someone can prevent anything. How can a jury be prevented from awarding Masa's film, if it wants to give him a prize? A decision may be criticized; uncouth criticism may even abuse the jurors; then, to mention the worst scenario for public polemics, if the jurors are contentious, they may take it to court, but to prevent it? Excuse me, but I seem to detect here a certain logical correlation between your call for objectivity in the first part of your question and this particular expression in the second part. "Objectivity" can really be achieved by order if subjectivities are prevented from expressing their opinion. But who in the world would want that?

To answer all of your question, I think that a comprehensive picture of the past fifty years of our literature will be created in our national memory of history. Right now the criteria for values may be ephemeral; let us recall the assessments of Macha, Halas, Zahradnicek in their day, to name some who come to mind; but every ephemerally overrated value will be forever forgotten. Furthermore, the effect of art and its common acceptance follow a different cadence than the current era of

history; its cadence is delayed. Nevertheless, it is an interesting detail of that process that even the most obtuse individuals among critics will never fade in the memory of literary history. In conjunction with Halas, for instance, Ladislav Stoll will never be forgotten. Memory creates an image of the world from its lights as well as from its shadows.

[TVORBA] Soon after the events in November a year ago a correspondent of an American publication observed: "It will be interesting to see how the representatives of the opposition will be able to govern a nation which almost completely used to oppose them."

That observation displays his total lack of understanding. Our nation was not "against them," but rather, it kept silent and unheroically resorted to passive resistance against the powers that were. That attitude is ineffective, though a natural human reaction in which most of the people living under any totalitarian system find their refuge. In addition, some of our fellow citizens, especially intellectuals, believed that it is imperative to break down the power monopoly slowly and patiently from the inside.

We think that it is unhealthy to live in a condition of general psychosis where 90 percent of the nation have doubts about their right to walk with their heads up.

[Kanturkova] I will refrain from saying anything about that American correspondent; journalists are sometimes more intent on smart sayings than on understanding the situation of a country about which they write. As for me, I know of three Western journalists, Pavel Tigrid, Jacques Rupnik, and Timothy Garton Ash, who do understand our situation, sometimes even better than we can, because they are removed from it. But your question confirms in an interesting way that the interpretation of the situation stems directly from the position of the individual who interprets it. We interpolate our impressions, experience, frustrations, guilt feelings in our assessments. The perception of a "dissident" differs somewhat from the perception of a nondissident not only in terms of the past but also of the present. I for one would not regard the current feelings of disappointment and uncertainty as a general psychosis marked by a lack of self-confidence because of the passive resistance in the past.

I see the problem of freedom as the key to the interpretation of both past and present time. That correspondent calls dissent the "opposition." Nevertheless, he did not consider himself opposition; he did not see himself as such. It was public criticism of power; opposition trends in our dissent began to crop up about two years before the November events. The primary essence of our dissent programs, the publication of typewritten books, production of videotaped films, dramatic presentations held in private apartments, exhibits in courtyards, concerts in barns, compilation of Charter 77 documents, search for prisoners by the Committee for Defense of Unjustly Persecuted, and so on and so forth, represented

the simplest and the most difficult task—the need to act as a free individual. In the words of a slogan: "Those who opted for freedom have opted for dissent." This choice made in the heyday of a totalitarian system involved a risk of persecution; thus, it was a slightly eccentric decision. In his mordant essay chastising dissent for not fostering adequate responsibility for the fatherland, Petr Pithard wrote that "freedom tastes good." At the same time, it must be said that those risks were only courted in an already decrepit system and not under the threat of the terror of the 1950's when such a decision could be a matter of life or death. Even so, those risks were considerable because so few people would take them; obviously, they thought that freedom was worth it. This was one of the paradoxes of the past twenty years that if the prisoner had the will and the strength, he could live the inner life of a free man even in prison, as confirmed by Vaclav Havel in one of his best books, "Letters to Olga," which he wrote in prison.

On the other hand, the majority who opted for passive resistance, in your words, refused to take such risks for various reasons; freedom was not their supreme value. And that part which according to you believed that the monopoly of power must be slowly broken down from the inside wanted to gain freedom by a tolerably round-about way, at the price of their survival within the system. Please understand, this is not a judgment, this is a statement. In my opinion, dissidents would have been far worse off without those other, albeit moderate opponents, and vice versa. I know quite a few cases where both areas were intersected; the dissidents would protect the anonymity of their collaborators in the system, and the critics from the system would use Charter documents to express their views. The specificity of the environment was affected in some aspects and yet, these were two philosophies of life: How not to relinquish one's right to freedom, and how to survive without freedom. That is a common problem known from the times immemorial; for instance, I wrote a book about Hus to discuss precisely that type of individual. Hus's exact opposite was Stepan Palec whose efforts to defend his opportunism vis-a-vis the almighty church impelled him even to formulate a theory of the church in order to destroy Hus whose attitude to the Christ of the Gospel was liberal.

However, now it appears that this basic choice is not linked to totalitarianism alone but that to a certain degree it seems constant. I would restate your question: When else but in freedom should people stand up with self-confidence with their heads up? I agree with you that they are not doing so. Charter members are being blamed for taking over the positions of leadership, which bothers mainly the middle generation in the system, but that only obfuscates the whole issue. In my opinion, the heart of the problem is in the fact that the majority in question, those who according to your estimate number as many as 90 percent, are not suffering from any guilt complex for their past passive resistance; only a person who actively served the past regime may feel guilty.

More than their bowed heads I still see the same fears of risk taking but now they are not caused by totalitarianism but by freedom. The majority again hesitates and waits for what will be done for it by someone else—by the one upstairs, the one with well-bred responsibility and a higher salary, the more courageous one. I am no sociologist and cannot determine to what extent that may be a symptom of the totalitarian affliction and to what extent it is the prevalent Czech sobriety and the middle class mentality. And again, this is no judgment, only a statement, of course, a somewhat anxious statement because, after all, we have opted en masse for a system based on the freedom of risk taking.

[TVORBA] This is related to a question that worries us a great deal: It seems that you have approached this interview with an a priori bias against the editors of TVORBA. Where does it come from?

[Kanturkova] There is no a priori bias on my part against anyone, not even against TVORBA. My only consideration was to be asked questions that I want to answer, and not to be misquoted. Such is my attitude to any periodical.

[TVORBA] What is your opinion about the statement by Minister of Culture Uhde that "being a dissident does not qualify anyone for a job," and in general, about the disputes about the Ministry of Culture that are beginning to spill over its confines (for instance, Mr. Srb at the Old Town Square stating that the ministry is in Communist hands)? How can our society avoid getting bogged down in general investigations instead of moving ahead?

[Kanturkova] I gave my views on personnel changes and disputes in the Ministry of Culture to the people in charge. One of the most difficult positions is to be the head of any office or institution established in the past; and if there is anyone who takes upon himself such a task with all the responsibility it involves, which is precisely what Milan Uhde has done, he must have the right to choose his own staff. That is both his right and risk as well as a normal part of administration that—at long last!—is beginning to get organized in our country.

However, I should like to state my view about the investigations to which you referred. I regard them as a symptom of deeper processes than mere desires for revenge or for appointments to offices. Excuse me this banality by the way of introduction: We are creating the form and the depth of our democracy. And the democratic system is the outcome of political struggles, configurations, diversification, differentiation of various political trends, and of the consolidation or weakening of their positions. That is both normal and natural. The greatest possible latitude of platforms, even with certain expressions of malice at both its ends, is a requirement for a society that does not know itself and that must find out who in its midst has to be dealt with. And therefore it seems to me that for our democracy investigations are dangerous; this is not a problem of one side opposing

another, but of one superimposing itself on the other. The result is a self-appointed task force of the only righteous ones.

This method was inherited from the totalitarian system, and it is of little consequence whether it is used by the radicals of the revolution or those in the system who are shouting in order to prevent others from pointing them out. It stems from the source of concepts which, although still alive, are now being buried; it has its fathers and grandfathers. Various partly legitimate demands foment specific dissatisfactions; for example, the prisoners of the 1950's have every right to criticize the fact that they are being treated with a certain crassness. Indecision about the allocation of the property extorted from the state by the CPCZ are causing legitimate discontent. Considerable tensions are generated by questions concerning the ownership of agricultural lands, and so on. Although the already adopted democratic mechanisms can resolve all these matters, radical voices use them to demand an escalation of the revolution; by expanding their political impact, they are transformed into radical sentiments. I insist that the demand to make the Communist Party illegal, or the heckling against former Communists and even against former Communists who were members of the charter are doing great disservice to our democracy. The radical obsession that wants to turn inevitable personnel changes into demands for across-the-board investigation of all employees, or the necessary screening, into an instrument of public threat, elicits uncertainty and fear—a lack of self-confidence that you referred to—in our society. It is precisely this obsession accompanied by fear that radicalism usually ends the power held by a strong hand. Fortunately, however, we in Bohemia feel a sober distaste for any excesses, the same distaste that made us cower under totalitarian conditions but that can prudently balance cheap radical trends under the conditions of freedom, as confirmed by both our elections. With their horse sense the 90 percent whom you mentioned fully understood democracy as a specification of rules for all. On the other hand, exclusions are endless; the end is the excluder himself, his fanaticism and his vicious intolerance.

[TVORBA] You took an active part in discussions concerning M. Dolejsi's article about the background of 17 November 1989, published in EXPRESS. The editor of MLADA FRONTA asked you whether some taboos may exist in a democratic society. Apparently, even your answer failed to convince him. Would you wish to comment on this whole story?

[Kanturkova] I think that enough has already been said and written about this case. Now an investigation by the parliamentary commission will be of decisive importance. For your information, I should like to mention one detail. The [state] television succeeded in showing the agent Zifcak in his true colors; on the screen I recognized the man who used to attend several of our demonstrations. The first time around, I saw him being dragged by uniformed policemen from the unsanctioned demonstration on Human Rights Day in December

1987. Next, on 21 August of the following year, he kept prancing around Tomas Hradilek and me. Charter spokesmen were then supposed to lay flowers at St. Wenceslas's statue but the police seized them already at their homes, so Tomas and I met at the statue and before the police realized what was up, we laid the flowers in lieu of the spokesmen while a big crowd of people waiting there was watching. It is a juicy story that Zifcak began yelling in a provocative way but I told him to keep quiet. I had no idea that it was Zifcak, I thought that it was some slightly cracked student who tends to overdo everything; if his task then was to get us arrested, he certainly failed.

[TVORBA] That put considerations about the prompt adoption of a new press law into the spotlight. However, while journalists (and not only the journalists but also the representatives of international organizations monitoring the transformation of our society into a democratic society) would like to see it as a guarantee of the freedom of the press, the vice chairman of the Czech National Council stated that the law must be adopted so as to give the state some means for the prosecution of the journalists to prevent them from destabilizing our political situation.

This leads to some questions we should like to ask: What exactly is the latitude of the freedom of the press in a free society? Can a democratic society be built by undemocratic means?

[Kanturkova] I did not have enough time to verify the statement you mention attributed to the vice chairman of the Czechoslovak National Council, in other words, my colleague in the parliament. We have four vice chairmen, and I do not know which one of them you are referring to. If in fact he said what you quoted, then I do not agree with him. Freedom of the press is the most significant democratic right of all citizens and not only of journalists. The right to write and receive free information is the most important interrelation in society. In its own way it is more important than the discussions and control of the parliament, because it is dynamic and instantly brings into action all individuals interested in it; it is a mass reaction with a direct impact. A journalist may irritate me with his sloppiness, his proclivity for overdramatization, tendency to sensationalism, and superficiality, but all I can do about it is to object to it, because even a sloppy journalist may once in his life be lucky and reveal dirt that should be revealed. It is axiomatic that we respect credible journalists who can discern the correlations of various phenomena, but on the other hand, we too can use our head and find our way through irresponsible reporting. The tendency to highlight scandals and the desire to excel through catastrophic judgments are a more acceptable price to pay for all the guarantees stemming from the freedom of the press than the harm that censorship of the press might inflict. To give you a point-blank answer to your question: Freedom does not extend from here to there; freedom is freedom, period. Its only restriction is that it cannot restrict another person's freedom. If a journalist

does that, let us say, by slandering someone, then anyone can take the case before the court, and it does not have to be the criminal court; public judgment is sufficient.

[TVORBA] You took a very resolute stand against the theory of "general conspiracy." On the other hand, on the first anniversary of 17 November, it is certain that the romantic-heroic version of a popular revolt does not correspond with reality. It is indisputable that the situation prior to 17 November was untenable and that the majority of our nation yearned for a change. But what is the whole truth about 17 November? Which interpretation are you inclined to accept?

[Kanturkova] The whole truth of 17 November is that on that day an opportunity offered itself to bring down the Communist totalitarian system. It is a matter of specific historical interpretation to what extent it was played against the background of someone's intrigue or to what extent it was a victory of the students, actors, workers, Vaclav Havel, the Civic Forum and democratic forces, or other movements and parties. The most important aspect of November 1989 is the internal collapse of the Communist power and consequently, we were able to make faster strides forward than other countries to form a society that would invalidate the outcome of February 1948. I find it rather amusing that General Lorenc or the agent Zifcak could also have had their fingers in this antirevolutionary revolution, but that certainly cannot spoil my picture of that event. I remember well how the waves of popular resistance came rolling one after another. And even if some Zifcaks did follow their orders to lead the demonstration on 17 November all the way to Narodni Avenue for the planned slaughter, which we may see as a premeditated plot against the conservative faction in the CPCZ as well as a warning to disobedient opponents, then neither the theatre strike on the following day nor the founding of the Civic Forum fit that scenario. I was at the Laterna Magica theatre from the beginning and I followed closely how the revolt was breaking the rotten power step by step. I regard Vaclav Havel as the protagonist recognized as such by all; he committed no mistakes and in every new situation was always a step ahead of the rest of us in the Civic Forum. The truth about 17 November is that if the Civic Forum had not benefited from Havel's principles, fast thinking, courage in action, imagination, ability to foresee the extent of risks, his profoundly humane and democratic attitudes, it would not be what it has become: the epicenter of the revolution. The core of the Civic Forum was composed of Charter members and organizers of the "A Few Sentences" campaign; other opponents of the regime from the governmental structures gathered around them and a consensus was reached not only within the Civic Forum but also between it and the population. The change was not achieved by the students, actors, or intellectuals alone, far from it; in its first week the arrival of the workers from the Ceskomoravska Kolben Danek factories to Wenceslas Square marked the decisive turning point toward victory. The Civic Forum did not address its call for a general strike only to

intellectuals and students, but to the grass roots and among them, particularly to workers. The crowds under the balconies recognized precisely what they wanted; to this day their chant "It is here!" rings in my ears. Only a brain muddled by totalitarian ideology, where police is all-powerful and an invisible hand pulls the strings of events, would think that conspiracy was the source of such radical changes as our revolution. We Czechs are blessed with a great talent of witnessing the most important landmarks of our history in the street; although an individual in the crowd remains anonymous, the event is visible because it takes place in the public square. After all, you can see how ridiculous Zifcak looked under the tent on Narodni Avenue and recently before the election committee, and compare it with our total accomplishments achieved in one year.

[TVORBA] Have not the ongoing changes in the Civic Forum betrayed its original ideals? Do they really express the will of the majority? Will they not discourage some of the voters? What place do you see for yourself in the current political spectrum?

[Kanturkova] I am not sure that I understand the changes you have in mind. If it is the election of Vaclav Klaus as chairman of the Civic Forum, can that be any betrayal? If you mean the differentiation and more exact delineation of various trends in the Civic Forum, then those trends were there from the beginning although they did not have any distinctive name. The only thing contrary to its spirit is the attempt to exclude any individual from the movement. However, it is only natural that the movement strives for a more characteristic form as well as internal organization and discipline. On the other hand, to me it seems unnatural when the representatives of the Civic Forum fight one another in the parliament. This openness is an idiosyncrasy that requires a great deal of energy and above all, time. By the same token, if the Civic Forum turns prematurely into an extremely singular political party, it may well become less attractive to many of its voters. However, I think that the Civic Forum is a living organism which sensitively reacts to the trends in public life, and therefore, it will avoid such a pitfall. Furthermore, in a situation when its opposition is either amorphous or paralyzed and only beginning to take a shape and getting organized, the Civic Forum has the advantage of not being ideologically monolithic. To be sure, it is so strong that its need to achieve consensus within its ranks softpedals its potential domineering proclivities. It is obvious that the Civic Forum will eventually become as differentiated as the public by which it was elected. So far there has been very little of that, as confirmed by the results of our municipal elections. As far as they are concerned, it is worth considering that independent candidates, possibly some of the persons, whose names may have appeared last spring on the ballots of the Civic Forum, obtained a big share of the votes. We shall see a greater political as well as social differentiation after the liberalization of our economy and agriculture and formation of new social groups. The latitude of the Civic Forum reflects

the transitional character of the current period. As for our economic reform, I myself support Klaus's radical approach, although conceptually I belong to the center of the Civic Forum. I am a writer and for me it is unthinkable to join any rigidly organized party.

[TVORBA] How do you look at the fact that in our country so many artists have entered the political arena? An artist evidently brings into politics a rather distinctive moral imperative; how does he or she perceive the responsibility and the ethics of his or her political involvement?

[Kanturkova] The moral imperative is introduced into politics indirectly; direct participation of artists in politics is not such a lofty matter as your question suggests, as you seem to believe. Politics is a difficult, practical job. I am a deputy of the Czech National Council and a member of its presidium, which calls for many hours of concentration when the laws are discussed. My responsibility manifests itself by the fact that I analyze and study issues and draw my own conclusion about them. My ethical principles tell me that I must not disappoint the people who elected me. In addition to the duties common to all deputies, I feel a special responsibility for such matters because I am a writer and a member of the council of the Writers' Association and as such, I help solve some extremely knotty cultural problems, for instance, publication of books during our transition to a market economy. Or when the law on Czech cinematography was drafted, I was appointed to help settle some highly contradictory standpoints of our film industry employees. That involves most of all a search for a rational procedure and the solution of extremely complex problems. In addition, our greatest moral duty is, in my view, aid to helpless persons who have been affected by various injustices and to individuals without much influence. I am getting many letters. Not everybody has a request of me; I am trying to assist all in finding some solution to their problem, and precisely the trust which these people express to me in their letters turns my public work into something more important than just plain involvement in the policymaking process. It is the human contact for which a writer is grateful because it helps him overcome the always recurrent impression that he is sailing on a galleon where he is out of place.

POLAND

Walesa's 1st Month as President Reviewed

91EP0279A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
5 Feb 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "The First Month of the Presidency"]

[Text] More than a month has passed since Lech Walesa took the presidential oath. This is too short a period to evaluate his presidency in terms of implementing the promises made during the electoral campaign. Still, one

can try to simply sum up the actions taken during these first 30-odd days of the Third Republic.

The first and most urgent problem he faced after taking the oath was the need to form a government quickly. The president personally held talks until the moment the candidate for prime minister was nominated. Afterward, the whole matter was resolved and the decisions on cabinet appointments to was left to Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. Therefore, the prime minister is right to term his cabinet an auctorial government.

Along with forming the government, the president began consultations on appointing a political council. He received at Belvedere Palace several dozen representatives of political parties, caucuses of parliamentary deputies, trade unions, and [Solidarity's] Citizens Committee.

One of the first persons he talked with was Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Following their conversation, both politicians strongly emphasized the need to "piece together" what had been "ruptured" during the electoral campaign. However, to this day the then predicted second meeting between them has not taken place.

The formation of the political council was the most commented upon initiative of the president during the month. The climate of the discussions of this fact was influenced by the not too felicitous comments of the Presidential Press Spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski, and especially his claim that "Belvedere Palace was the new focus of the national political scene." This was criticized as an attempt to form a supergovernment, a superparliament.

The president rectified the matter by stating at a press conference that the political council was to be of an exclusively opinion-making, consultative, and advisory nature. He declared that he wants to relieve the government of current political disputes [and] provide it with conditions for a peaceful implementation of the economic reform.

The formation of the political council is also being interpreted as an attempt to postpone the parliamentary elections until the fall. Lech Walesa's comments at a meeting with the Presidium of the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] seem to validate this interpretation.

A major effect of the measures intended to form the political council is that the political parties took a position on the timing of the parliamentary elections. Nearly all political groupings declared themselves to be in favor of the spring.

Walesa declared that he wants to discuss with the new political council his position on this issue.

In the last few days Wojciech Włodarczyk was appointed plenipotentiary in charge of organizing the team of presidential advisers, a body appointed independently of the political council. But it is known that Włodarczyk is no supporter of the idea of forming that council.

The spate of declarations by political parties demanding that the elections be scheduled for this coming spring, the speeding up of the work to appoint the Team of Presidential Advisers, and the announcement that [Solidarity's] Citizens Committee will continue to exist—until the elections—may prompt Lech Walesa to support the holding of the elections this spring. But the final decision on the matter will be taken by the parliament.

The first month of Lech Walesa's presidency has been dominated by the international situation: the war in the Persian Gulf and the events in the Baltic republics.

Concerning the former matter the president has taken a definite position, unequivocally favoring the implementation of all the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. Walesa's letter elicited a speedy and amicable reply from President of the United States George Bush.

The president's position on the events in Lithuania has been defined as relatively undecided, and as such it has been criticized. It appears, however, that such criticisms are premature. Walesa said that, before taking any steps, he wants to become well versed in the situation. He has held talks on this matter with, among others, the Polish Ambassador to Moscow Stanislaw Ciosek, and twice with Zbigniew Brzezinski. The president was consulted on both the government declaration concerning the events in the republics and the related declaration of the parliament.

At his meeting with the Presidium of the OKP, Walesa attributed his caution to the fear that the worst of the anticipated scenarios may take place. Such a scenario would mean a direct threat to Poland's national sovereignty.

The President of the Republic of Poland has also rejected the proposal of Vaclav Havel, made during a telephone conversation, for issuing a joint declaration on the events in the Baltic republics. He promised to take a position only when the situation becomes clearer, and we are still waiting for that.

An important domain of Lech Walesa's activities is and surely shall remain the military. In place of the National Defense Committee Jacek Merkel is forming the National Security Council, with the president to be its chairman.

Moreover, during the month Lech Walesa exercised the normal duties of his office as the head of state. Already during his first few days in office he had signed six laws, one of them being the law on the tax on ceiling-exceeding wage increases.

He has met with the diplomatic corps at the Royal Castle. He has commenced to replace the personnel of Polish diplomatic missions abroad. He has appointed new ambassadors to Chile, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, and France. He has offered nominations for the posts of

ministers, secretaries, and undersecretaries of state at the Presidential Chancellery. The formation of that chancellery is still continuing.

The president is operating under considerable public pressure, which to a large extent he himself had prompted while still a presidential candidate. The public expects of him that he carry out his promise of acceleration and expects, of course, some spectacular results.

It is too early to tell which model of the presidency will be followed by Lech Walesa. On the basis of just one month in office, only a guess can be made.

That model will be ultimately determined by the parliament. On observing Lech Walesa's official actions at Belvedere Palace during the first few weeks of his presidency, it may be deduced that he shall exercise scrupulously the powers to be granted to him under the [new] constitution.

Future of Solidarity's Citizens Committee

91EP0235A Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish
7 Jan 91 pp 1, 4

[Article by (E.O.): "Walesa Disappoints: Citizens Committee Explores Formulas for Survival"]

[Text] Last Sunday's, 6 January, meeting of the Citizens Committee under Lech Walesa commenced with a reading of a letter from President Lech Walesa. The President apologized for his absence, attributing it to pressure of duties. He expressed his gratitude to all those present for their participation in the committee's work, but claimed that a change in its concept is needed. He also proposed convening a final, gala meeting at which he would express his personal thanks to all committee members for their contributions so far.

Zdzislaw Najder informed those present that on 3 January he and Jan Olszewski met with the President, who presented to them the idea of a political council that is to consist of representatives of all political groupings, including former Communists as well. At that time Lech Walesa emphasized that the concept of the Citizens Committee should be changed in order to adapt it to the new conditions. The political council which he intends to convene is to be of a broad, official nature, "whereas the committee so far has been only representing the proindependence forces associated with Solidarity."

As Zdzislaw Najder put it at last Sunday's meeting, "The committee so far has been creating the rules for democracy rather than democratic structures. It has been promoting the unfolding of events in the direction of pluralism, in accordance with Lech Walesa's desire. The presidential elections showed that many people still do not feel themselves to be represented by any political force. The committee's aim should, therefore, be that no social group would feel isolated. It also should encourage participation in public life, for which Prime Minister Bielecki had appealed. For without participation there

can be no feeling of shared responsibility, and there can be no accountability of the government for its actions.

"The growth of democracy requires adherence to several rules. The electorate must be able to choose among several concepts, and it should be made to feel that its participation in voting does matter. The procedural rules of the political forces should be clear: If compromises are concluded, their rationales have to be explained. Criticism of the authorities also is needed. The only question is whether the Citizens Committee is needed for all this?"

The audience's opinions on this issue were divided. Jerzy Mikke claimed that the President's letter could be interpreted as a farewell, but it would be a bad idea for the committee to disband itself. It cannot be supplanted by some political council. In the opinion of Mieczyslaw Gil, the President's letter does not mean that the committee should disband itself; it merely means that its concept should be altered. A similar opinion was voiced by Senator Jerzy Stepień in a letter addressed to those present. He suggested that the present body could transform itself into an electoral committee, because it might turn out during the coming parliamentary elections that the party of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz or Stanislaw Tyminski would win a majority of the votes. Lech Wałęsa's voters cannot be left to themselves.

"I understand pluralism," said Wojciech Ziembinski, "but what are we going to do in a political council to which the gentlemen Cimoszewicz, Kwasniewski, and Miller also are invited as members, considering that we intended and still intend to eliminate postcommunist structures?" Stefan Kurkowski declared, "A political council would be a continuation of the roundtable. If its appointment is intended to postpone the [parliamentary] elections, that would be a big mistake. Contrary to [Wałęsa's] preelectoral assurances, there is no acceleration; there rather is a slowdown. The new government is being born slowly. The inconsistencies besetting the economic program may result in that a few months hence Prime Minister Bielecki will face the problem of restructuring the government and the economic situation will rather deteriorate. That is why any new concept of the committee should be predicated on its independence, so that criticism of the government would be possible. Disbanding the committee would mean impoverishing sociopolitical life in this country."

"This committee," he continued, "should either disappear or turn into something else if someone is wise enough to come up with a new concept of it. We should not war against Wałęsa while our committee is associated with his name. Otherwise we shall only cover ourselves with ridicule. We shall become a couch-potato organization for aggrieved people which will issue declarations for the press. We cannot exist against Wałęsa's wishes. Mr. President is not here with us, and he has not attended our two previous meetings either, which shows

clearly that he no longer needs us." Janusz Korwinski-Mikke also declared that the committee has fulfilled its role and should be disbanded.

"The committee is losing its importance," said Kazimierz Woycicki, "also because of the one-sided tone of its discussions. It has become a forum for highly critical attacks against Balcerowicz's reforms. It should therefore be disbanded, and its members should have the courage of joining the political parties of their choice. The committee may transform itself into a party, but the tone of its comments inclines me to believe that it will be opposed to reforms and to Wałęsa himself. We should therefore consider whether that is what we want."

During the voting it turned out that the proposal to disband the committee was out of order, because one half of those present had left the meeting room. Hence, a proposal for transforming the Citizens Committee under Lech Wałęsa into the National Citizens Committee and amending the statute, offered by Andrzej Słowiak, was voted upon. Twenty-three people voted in favor. The proposal of Andrzej Kostarczyk to transform the Citizens Committee into the Program Council under the Citizens Foundation was favored by 14 persons, with eight abstaining (altogether the committee's membership is 200). Both proposals are to be presented to Lech Wałęsa.

Katowice Voivod Explains Regionalization Proposal

Economic Possibilities Stressed

91EP0221A Poznan WPROST in Polish No 50,
16 Dec 90 pp 32-33

[Interview with Wojciech Czech, voivod, Katowice Voivodship, by Jerzy Przylucki; place and date not given: "Waking Up the Giant"]

[Text] [Przylucki] Not long ago, as the first voivod in Poland, you revealed your own concept for dividing up the country. How does it go?

[Czech] It is no coincidence that I was born in Upper Silesia. I am an advocate of having the country's administrative structure correspond as much as possible to the historically shaped natural and cultural configurations. For centuries certain areas in Poland have been shaped naturally with specific cultural determining factors: Wielkopolska, Małopolska, Eastern and Western Pomerania, Upper Silesia, Lower Silesia, and our eastern structures of the country, broken, brutally sliced by the eastern border. But that is getting into another issue.

[Przylucki] You have been talking the whole time about historical matters.

[Czech] I am starting with them, but no less important in creating the present concept are the economic conditions and the more difficult criterion of the past, which permits the population of Central Europe, Poles

included, to meet not only their needs but also their, let us say, Western European ambitions.

[Przylucki] Do you consider this realistic?

[Czech] Well, let the regions of the Republic, with their material, human, and other potential begin to compete with similar regions, like those in Great Britain, Italy, France, and Germany, for example.

[Przylucki] But in those countries the divisions did not interfere with development.

[Czech] That is true. In the Republic cohesive regions have gradually been disintegrating since the time of the partitions. Except that in Silesia this phenomenon began earlier, in the 14th Century. The invaders also employed the tried and true Roman principal of "Divide and Conquer." This made it easier to govern the stubborn. But we should return to the sources. By awakening the consciousness of the great cultural communities, we have the opportunity of bringing regions back to life.

[Przylucki] The hardest thing is going to be to do it in Upper Silesia.

[Czech] Yes, Upper Silesia was the first Polish area to fall apart and disintegrate. It lies at the crossroads of Europe. It has been a tasty morsel and still is.

[Przylucki] But it has retained its identity.

[Czech] This really is a phenomenon, but it has not been thoroughly examined. What is astounding among the many features of Upper Silesian identity is the region's polycentricity, a unique feature in Europe. The region created its cultural identity on the basis of not one center but several of equal importance: Opole, Raciborz, Cieszyn, Bytom, and Oswiecim. The foreign was eagerly accepted in Upper Silesia. Despite the fact that the Silesians were very religious, they were also tolerant. This was the only industrial region in Europe that was not laicized at the turn of the 20th Century. Or take the multinational aspect: Poles, Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Moravians, and Jews. Today we talk about German culture's great influence on Upper Silesia, not appreciating the tremendous impact of Slovak culture, especially on Silesian folklore, on its art. Other features of Upper Silesian identity are social egalitarianism, the lack of antagonism between town and country, state equality, and so on.

[Przylucki] Indeed. That is how it was, but not many of these values are left today. Are you building your concepts on mythology?

[Czech] These values exist. We just need to dig them up out of the ashes. But the Silesian Czechs I was talking about make a positive distinction among the various regions of Poland.

[Przylucki] Are you depicting Silesia as a model for the Republic?

[Czech] Upper Silesia! Because in regional values Poland is a great power that is frozen, or, rather, asleep. We have to call out to it. As everyone knows, powerful Małopolska, Wielkopolska, our own Upper Silesia and Mazowsze are structures based on sound foundations. This is that very Republic, in the multiplicity of its concepts, variety in the very broad sense. But getting back to our issues, by carrying out the concept presented we will be able to achieve most quickly the goals we are interested in.

[Przylucki] But a giant will grow up, one creating nearly half the gross national income....

[Czech] Upper Silesia will not grow into a giant. It already is one. And this giant would be a region of positive factors radiating out over the whole country and enriching it, which after all is in keeping with tradition.

[Przylucki] However a powerful Upper Silesia can stand up to the central Authorities—Małopolska or Mazowsze maybe are afraid of its hegemony—as perhaps can Wielkopolska, which is just as strong.

[Czech] I think that there could be resistance to our concept, that there is even bound to be resistance. This is why we must convince [others] that the concentration of positive elements can not be a threat, but it [the concentration] always remains a chance. We want to reverse the bad that was done through the [geographical] divisions, both in our area and throughout the country.

[Przylucki] Upper Silesia needs help to rebuild. The simplest thing would be to get help from Germany.

[Czech] Upper Silesia is rebuilding on its own. What is important is not where the help comes from but how Upper Silesia organizes cooperation with other regions of Europe. We should decide for ourselves who we will cooperate with and in what realm, but we cannot really wait for somebody to help us. We have to help ourselves, invoke the processes to integrate us with the West. On the other hand, we cannot gear ourselves solely to the Germans. We are going to do business with whomever we come across along the way. And we would like to choose for ourselves whom to follow. We might choose the Germans, of course, or the Belgians, or the French, or the Czechs, but this will be a sign that our decision is a free one. All courses are important to us. Not just the road to the West. This balance has been lost somewhere, and it is very hard to restore it just now.

[Przylucki] The noise level of the German minority is becoming an ever greater problem....

[Czech] I would not make a mountain out of a mole hill. The danger lies in the fact that the region has no identity. Unfortunately, Upper Silesians have been denied independent rule and have been discriminated against for centuries. Now an opportunity has appeared. We must not miss it.

Opole Voivod Opposes Proposal

91EP0221B Poznan WPROST in Polish No 50,
16 Dec 90 p 32

[Statement by Ryszard Zembaczynski, voivod, Opole Voivodship, on the concept proposed by Wojciech Czech, voivod of Katowice: "A Different Viewpoint"]

[Text] The country is in a difficult situation, and we are supposed to separate? Will even a single loaf of bread, a single house, or a single workplace come out of this reform? We are facing tremendous costs. I talked to the Katowice, Bielsko Biala, and Czestochowa voivods about these things. Looking at the Odra-Dunaj canal, you can dream up a whole variety of great plans. I am a realist. I operate with my feet on the ground. I am absolutely opposed to these ideas. True, the issue can be discussed, best among organization and management experts, among sociologists and economics specialists. If

they see the need for a new [system of administrative] division, their ideas can be taken seriously.

The Opole region is a tempting morsel for our neighbors. It has been managed and is on a pretty sound cultural footing. We have many foreign ties. That is really something. We can talk about regional independence, because we want Opole Silesia to be more independent than it is now.

We can begin talks the moment our neighbors clean up their own back yards. Then, when the idea of regionalization matures, it will be based on principles of great regional independence vis-a-vis the central authorities and on complete self-governance. I do not want to offend anyone, but at the moment I do not see our neighbors demonstrating great efficiency. They are not availing themselves of the opportunity they have. Take the Silesian Customs Area.... We want to cooperate with the Katowice Voivod as a partner, not be his vassal.

BULGARIA

Shortages Affect Military Supplies

Introduction

91BA0183A Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian
4 Dec 90 p 2

[Materials prepared for the press by Engineer Major Bozhidar Spasov: "Will the Rear Area Hold Out? Rear Area Seethes and Boils. Rear Area Gasps for Breath. Rear Area Wants Money but There Is Not Enough. Rear Area, Supported by the National Economy, Will Hold Out."]

[Text] There is a shortage of cooking oil. The prices of foodstuffs and other products keep rising and rising. Deliveries contracted for are no longer filled normally. Instead of cooking oil, lard; instead of fruit preserves, jelly; instead of coffee, tea; instead of green beans, sauerkraut and sliced peppers.... There still are meat and meat products, and the prices are unchanged because in these the Army is self-sufficient. But there is a fodder shortage; we have none and it is expensive.

Instead of two pairs of gym shoes per soldier, only one. Instead of a shirt and a pullover tunic, only a pullover tunic. Fewer shorts, fewer undershirts....

We have scheduled km remaining because they are granted by a stroke of the pencil, but there is little fuel and it does not suffice for all the military activity. We have antifreeze, but there are no reserves of it, and they are needed. Instead of tanks and combat vehicles, other transport means will have to do without.... How do matters stand with respect to high combat readiness? I should not wonder if it, too, in its turn is breathing its last gasp. Under these conditions is it going to remain constant and high?

The rear area is seething and boiling. The rear area is gasping for breath. It wants money; there is not enough. Is the rear area, supported by the national economy, going to hold out?

Under these conditions we can debate as much as we like, long and heatedly, what kind of army we need—professional or conscript, and how much it has been depoliticized.

Unfortunately, the time has come when we have to ask whether we are going to have the kind of army we used to have. Or whether we even need such an army.

Larger, smaller, smaller yet; armed or poorly armed.... It exists and is going to exist. But insecurity is knocking at its door. For personnel, for armament, for provision of pay, food and clothing allowances.

An army is the state's army, hence everybody's army. And its image is everybody's concern. Everybody's duty, too. Paramount duty, moreover. But our national security is rapping at the Grand National Assembly's door.

Do those in there hear it? Or do the country's politicians and statesmen not perceive what is happening in the army? Most likely they are warmed agreeably by the other "substantial" guarantees, by the prospects of concluding nonaggression treaties, by who knows what other "warm" rays!

Food

91BA0183B Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian
4 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Captain Petur Andreev: "Lard Instead of Cooking Oil, Tea Instead of Coffee..."]

[Text] Prices fluctuate. Supply services are hampered by shortages in the market and in production.

In 1990 we had planned to buy potatoes at 22 stotinkas per kg, but we are now buying them on average at 1.60 leva; canned fruit at 89 stotinkas but we are buying them at two leva. We are getting pickles on average at 2.10 leva instead of 65 stotinkas. Sauerkraut, scheduled at 32 stotinkas, has jumped to two leva, and fish, from an average of one lev per kilogram, now costs us four leva. To date (editor's note: 23 November), the prices of meat and meat products have not varied, but we are self-sufficient in meat. The problem here is something else—we have no fodder. We are now offered seven tons at 90 stotinkas per kilogram. And we are going to have to buy it merely because we are authorized to. To date we have purchased only from Zurneni Khrani and only at fixed prices, with no right to take a look in the free market at its prices.

Packaging has become three or four times more expensive. The price of wire packing cases has gone up from 2.80 and 3.50 leva respectively to 12 and 14 leva. To make matters worse, they do not buy them back. The warehouses have begun to be congested, and our money is not circulating, either; it is frozen.

This is the way, as early as the end of September and the beginning of October, we had already spent the item 6-A money allotted for the whole year. Now we have to request additional budgetary funds every month. The bad thing is that, if we request, for example, 3 million, we are given 800,000. They keep telling us they do not have any. Does it follow that we are not going to provide the Army with rations? They will give eventually, and, for the time being, we know we are going to get by and that only the tension will remain. But the tension, believe me, does exist.

Under shortage conditions, where can we set about making substitutions? For some of the cooking oil shortage, we can substitute lard—for coffee, tea. The Vitamina Canning Combine in the city of Stamboliyski refused us the green beans we had contracted for. Instead, they gave us sauerkraut in jars and sliced peppers. But we have the sauerkraut we contracted for and in abundance. We are losing diversity in our diet. Fruit preserves are not arriving; we were refused by

Sliven, Pazardzhik, Stara Zagora, Stamboliyski.... The gentlemen there have the fruit, but they do not have the sugar. Instead of cherry preserves, they offer us jelly. And what can we do but accept? Our personnel still have to eat, do they not? Instead of strawberry preserves, they give us blended fruit preserves. In quantity they are the same, but they differ in quality....

Order 125 still has us pinned down today with its requirements—this and what is due per person per day. But tying the hands of the rations supply officers is not realistically possible and advisable here and now. We must set about running the mess on a free ration system: so much money per day, that is the kind of ration there will be. The necessary professional responsibility is, of course, mandatory. Obviously, fixed quantities and products must be dropped from the ration tables. I am not revealing anything new; these matters are known to us, we have discussed them together. As a result, we await provocations with calm, but not with resignation.

Fuel

91BA0183C Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian
4 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Major Simeon Grigorov: "Fuel Shortage"]

[Text] What does "fuel shortage" mean? It means that the allotted consumption caps have been limited. And that there is not enough to make possible all military activity. A scheduled number of km and motor-hours have been allotted for combat training and activity. Ideally, they are covered by the fuel provided. For combat training and mobilization needs, scheduled km and fuel are in a one-to-one ratio, but there will be a shortage for transportation needs. And these are the vehicles that are constantly on the move, carrying rations, personnel, ammunition, and materiel. Therefore, when we plan the km to be driven and the fuel for the year ahead and apportion the one to the other, it turns out that our UAZ vehicles should consume 9.5 liters per 100 km. But we all know that they consume 18-19 liters.

At the same time, as of 25 October 1990, an order cut our allotted POL by 25 percent, with the result that, when we talk about scheduled km and fuel, we should realize that the scheduled km can be entered or struck off, but it is fuel and its availability that are decisive rather than the allotted km. If you have allotted km but no fuel for them, what good do the allotted km do you?

With the electricity shortage, the units have changed over to gasoline and diesel generators so as to have constant illumination and power where it is needed. The fuel allotted for these, at another time and under different conditions, does not suffice today. We are entering upon overconsumption of motor-hours, and this requires fuel, too.

Somebody gets an idea. Make a new plan, and there you are! But this will not change a thing because there is no

fuel, period. The units will somehow or other get fuel from a fuel service station, but then the fuel available to them there and allotted for some particular training or program will decline.

It must also be realized that in the life of the units there are programs that, as a rule, are not provided with fuel in advance. Examples are various independent construction projects. But if, with human labor, commanders can vary the amount, with fuel they cannot. Hitherto, the units have bought junked tractors and vehicles from scrap and reconditioned them. They used them inside their regions without permitting them outside their portal, but used quite a lot of fuel with them. The depleted fuel service stations will force these vehicles to come to a halt.

According to the new ministerial order that will become effective in 1991, the percent of maximally permissible overexpenditure will increase from 40 to 60 percent. This is normal, considering the obsolescent materiel. The units will take advantage of this possibility, and requisitions for these extras will be made, but the amount of fuel will remain the same. Obviously, the commanders are going to have to realize this and reckon with the fact that their reserves may remain unsupplemented. I expect that many of the commanders who have been working with "verve" will be subdued.

There used to be an order that any vehicle showing systematic overconsumption should be suspended until it was repaired. Can this order be fully implemented given the obsolete vehicle pool and the shortage of spare parts? Far from it! But such vehicles must at least be used for everyday or intensive transportation.

There is an antifreeze shortage in the entire country. Our needs are fully met, but we have no reserve. With its powerful pumps, a tank will, if a connection breaks, eject all the antifreeze on the ground in a second or two. The commanders' next step? They are going to encroach upon the materiel that might freeze up with water—for the sake of the combat vehicles. In some places water will be added to the antifreeze as an emergency measure, and this will make it worthless. We need a reserve, but there is none. And the lack is something terrible.

The service life of our refueling stations has expired. This is true in over 80 percent of the cases. Nothing is being brought in. There are no spare parts. Today we tinker, we make do. Frankly speaking, to execute one mission, we commit other violations.

Clothing, Soap

91BA0183D Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian
4 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel Lyubomir Stefanov: "The Military Wardrobe Has Grown Lighter"]

[Text] What did a soldier used to get free of charge, and what does he get today?

Lest there be misunderstandings, I must first say that Directive No. 28 of 4 August 1989 reduced the amount of some of the clothing allowance. That is why soldiers now will get only a pullover tunic instead of a pullover tunic and a shirt. They used to get two pairs of gym shoes and two pairs of colored sports trunks; now, one of each. Instead of two knit long-sleeved undershirts and a pair of long-legged underpants twice a year, they will get them once a year; instead of one sports T-shirt a year, they will now get one for their entire period of service.

Soldiers receive free of charge, one time, shoe brushes, slippers or sandals, and a sweat suit. Three leva worth of toilet paper at its old prices for one year; 125 grams of shoe polish and 100 grams of toilet soap twice during the winter months and three times during the summer months.

So, if the soldiers of our units do not receive say 7.6 rolls of toilet paper a year or something else from among the enumerated items, something has happened in the chain of supply—the subunit's master sergeant, the unit's depot, the depot at the superior installation—because the young soldiers and fighting men who in September had completed a year's service in the Army have been provided with everything due them. By everything I mean: clothing—combat and parade dress; gear—barracks bag, knapsacks; sports equipment—gym shoes and sweat suits; underwear and shoes; bedding; toiletries. The only thing we have not received is two-thirds of the military blankets due us. The shortage is distributed uniformly over the units. This does not mean, however, that the soldiers have nothing to tuck up in. A blanket has a service life of four years. Hence, the units will not be able to replace their outworn blankets this year.

I do not know how the officers above us work, but the scarce items such as washing powder, soap, and toilet paper have been supplied to us. We are completely satisfied. Preconditions exist, however, for the lowering of hygiene by virtue of the money the units have at their disposal for supplementary needs but with which, in the general shortage, they have not managed to buy what they need.

Editor's Note: Our representative made an on-the-spot check the same day on how the soldiers were being supplied with one of the scarce articles—toilet paper. It turned out that "something had happened in the chain of supply" in the unit where Officer G. Indzhov is deputy commander for technical and logistical support. There toilet paper is issued to military personnel in the following manner: one roll on entering the barrack and periodically thereafter for battery and other field exercises. The subunit master sergeants with varying lengths of service did not know that each soldier was authorized 7.5 rolls per year and that the need for this article is daily like that for soap and shoe polish.

So, against the background of serious missions and problems, does concerning ourselves in the newspaper NARODNA ARMIYA with toilet paper mean that we are being frivolous?

Curtailing Privileges

91BA0184E Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian
4 Dec 90 p 2

[Article by Stoyanka Lozeva: "For Whom Are the Doors Opening?"]

[Text] The function of the military mess, according to the regulations, is to feed service personnel and, if possible, their families. We feed them. We still feed military employees and military pensioners, too, even though there are more of them than service personnel patronizing the mess.

Recently there has been an appreciable increase in the number of mess-hall patrons. It is easy to explain: The stores have been depleted, but here there is still everything, and it is diverse and cheap. Our mess hall is filled to overflowing. This is normal as a logical consequence, but it is not normal for a military mess because we have contracts for deliveries of food products that were made in the past under different conditions. They were calculated for a specific contingent. All of a sudden many military personnel and their families who had not used their right to mess with us have now begun to visit us because we had achieved a 50-percent reduction in the price of food, and, when the food prices outside rise, they rise correspondingly with us, too, but we still preserve the price reduction we had achieved. Our reserves and capabilities are not limitless, however.

For several days we have been collecting passes at the entrance to the mess. Why? For whom will the doors open?

We feed people from enterprises and organizations even if they are not military personnel—approximately some 30 persons in all from Unikalna Tekhnika, Aptchno Upravlenie...from the obshtina council of the BDM [expansion unknown], and so forth. We make a profit on them and lose nothing because their managements pay for overhead expenses and to help keep prices in our mess hall cheap. At the same time, these people eat at a time convenient for us and do not interfere with our military contingent. They are today our reserves for an uncertain future. But it turns out that individual passes have been issued with the seal and signature of our former manageress—passes ostensibly regular but issued to persons illegally patronizing the mess. We have had conflicts, too, in various instances: A young lady who received a pass lawfully subsequently let somebody else who was not entitled to eat with us use it. Possibly, two persons used the same pass, too. We have run across passes with our registration number, issued to civilians by the obshtina council, by the Fish and Fish Products Company...and by the obshtina council of the BDM. Some organizations have defrayed overhead expenses and a reduction of food prices for approximately five mess-hall patrons, and 10 of their employees have received passes.

Our reserve for keeping down the cost of food is dwindling and will dwindle more. We have difficulties that are growing and will continue to grow. Therefore, in the interest of the lawful mess-hall patrons, we should be relieved of those patrons who in some way have attached themselves and are clinging to us.

HUNGARY

Danish Company To Man EC Office in Budapest
91P20213A Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 1 Feb 91 p II 2

[Article by Lise Tajik: "Danish Company To Distribute All Financial Aid to Hungary"—first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] Dangroup has received the staffing contract for the EC office in Budapest which will direct and coordinate billions in financial aid to Hungary from abroad.

The Danish engineering firm Dangroup has won an attractive, prestigious contract in Hungary. Not a construction project, but a contract for the staffing of the PHARE [Poland-Hungary Reconstruction Assistance] secretariat under the Ministry of Economy in Budapest which will direct and distribute EC financial aid to Hungary. PHARE is the EC's aid program to the seven countries in East Europe.

Dangroup, which consists of the Carl Bro Group, Birch & Krogboe, Ramboll & Hannemann, and the N & R Group, as early as 20 February is sending three men to Budapest who among other things will ensure that the EC financial aid is administered responsibly. They will at the same time coordinate all economic aid to Hungary from the World Bank, The International Monetary Fund, and the so-called G-24 industrialized countries.

"The three will be placed so centrally that they will have a total overview over what is going on in Hungary," says Paul van der Kam, Dangroup's director.

The EC has granted Hungary 100-150 million ECU's [European Currency Units] (800 million-1.2 billion kroner) in 1991. The funds are earmarked for restructuring, privatization, environment, training, education, agriculture, and the social service system.

Michael Burisch, external consultant for Dangroup, has been selected as the evaluation expert and team leader, Kristian Torp, Dangroup, as the coordination expert, while the implementation expert, Erick van Overstraeten is being brought in from Dangroup's Belgian partner IBF. IBF forms part of a joint venture consisting of eight engineering firms from seven EC countries with the Danish company at the head.

The contract, which is worth approximately seven million kroner, runs over 18 months, but will presumably be extended since there is enough work for a much longer period, according to Paul van der Kam. Since 1987, Dangroup Joint Venture has carried out approximately 150 EC projects in Latin America and Asia with such satisfactory results that the company was urged to sign a framework agreement around PHARE.

'Stricter' Stock Market Regulations Introduced

91CH0304B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 22 Dec 90 p 89

[Unattributed article: "1 January: Stricter Stock Market"]

[Text] During the coming weeks, many investors will probably fail to find the rates of exchange for the stocks that they own or are planning to purchase listed in the stock exchange news. As of 31 December 1990, the era of stock exchange indulgence will come to an end. Beginning 1 January 1991, only those stocks and bonds which have been officially listed among the "registered" papers falling under stricter criteria, or among the "circulated" papers falling under less strict criteria, can be traded on the Budapest Stock Exchange. From what is known, the regulations that were drafted at the establishment of the stock exchange last June and later further refined, specify 31 December among the temporary orders as the time limit for trading—with disregard to the regulations' requirements—those bonds which had been on the market prior to the official opening of the exchange.

Financial indicators and the data of the Exchange Secretariat suggest that this regulation does not really concern the issuers. Of the issuers of roughly 60 kinds of stocks and 380 kinds of bonds that were on the market at the time of the exchange's official opening, only a single issuer, Konzum, applied for, and obtained exchange registration. A few more applications, the names of the firms are considered official secrets, were handed in during the last days but at the most, only one or two of them will be able to go through the official channels by the year's end. According to our information, groups of experts were set up in several banks to prepare the introduction of the banks' bonds at the exchange. But understandably, the financial institutions are very cautious. They would like to combine the introduction at the exchange with an increase of capital stock, but until now, in part because of [a lack of] demand, their bonds changed hands at prices that were far below their nominal value. Thus, probably only those six stocks—two of them, those of IBUSZ [Touring, Money Changing, Travelling, and Shipping Co. Ltd.] and Konzum Trade Ltd., are "registered", and those of Martfu, Dunaholding, Fotex, and MUSZI [Office for the Organization of Agricultural Business Management] are "circulated" papers—which were newly issued after the opening of the exchange and were introduced to the money market in accordance with regulations, can be traded early next year at the exchange.

It was the bonds that ended up in a really hopeless situation. The bonds on the market, whose nominal value totalled 20 million to 25 million forints, became permanent victims of inflation by not only getting farther away from the exchange but also from the possibility of circulation. Since early November, when the Budapest Bank also cancelled its earlier voluntary obligation in connection with the repurchase of bonds it took to the

market, bond circulation came to an almost complete halt, and the banks now buy bonds from investors at a ridiculously low price—if at all.

There is no doubt that the old issuers' lack of interest is primarily the result of the drop in the rates of exchange during the past months. Still, as the new stocks and bonds constituted most of the trade, the exclusion of old stocks will not affect trade at the exchange. The fact that "chucking out" unregistered stocks and bonds will probably not entail a change in the average exchange rate is an indication of the Budapest Stock Exchange's limited role as an indicator.

By definition, the trade of stocks now coming out of the exchange will be transferred into the direct circulation between banks dealing with trade of bonds and brokerages. In all probability, this will result in more limited information on the trade in the money market. The statistical crisis situation (i.e., an almost total absence of reliable information), a general characteristic in the Hungarian economy, is becoming an increasing threat in the capital market as well. Although merchants must make monthly reports to the Exchange Secretariat, and thus the public, on their outside-exchange trade of stocks which are classified as circulated, they do not comply with this obligation, thereby further increasing the investors' chances of being exploited as a result of a market that is impossible to overview. Hopefully, the Exchange Council, which now has 11 members since last week's induction of two new members, Imre Bertalan, broker of the First American-Hungarian Stock Agency, and Andras Laszlo, Director General of Co-Nexus, will also be able to pay more attention to this, too, in the coming year.

National Bank Head Calls for Full Debt Payment
91CH0304A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 22 Dec 90 pp 45-46

[Interview with Gyorgy Suranyi, president of the Hungarian National Bank, by Zoltan Horvath; place and date not given: "The MNB President Answers: 'Solvency Can Be Lost Only Once'"—first paragraph is HETI VILAGGAZDASAG introduction]

[Text] Gyorgy Suranyi (age 36), who was hardly known three years ago outside of the narrow circle of the profession, but who was already state secretary of the Planning Office during the Nemeth administration, and has been president of the Hungarian National Bank since the summer of this year, became head of a bank after spending nary a minute at any traditional financial institution. We asked the MNB [Hungarian National Bank] chief why he chose to take this position, which is considered a "gallows" by many, instead of a well-paying position abroad? What kinds of danger does he perceive? And what is his prognosis for economic survival?

[Horvath] Perhaps the study "Change and Reform" back in 1987 was secretly meant to be a government program, but in the end the establishment degraded it to merely a

tolerated study of reform. Since then, its creators dispersed in many directions, not only geographically or politically, but also in a spiritual sense. You played an important role during the Nemeth administration and you are now the president of the state bank. To what extent have the views of the reform group that began together drifted apart?

[Suranyi] I have not yet thought of this question, but I do not perceive that the thoughts and values around which we rallied three or four years ago have "drifted apart" that much. It is another question that if we see certain things differently today, it is due in part to the fact that looking at these processes from the theoretical and research side is quite different from looking at them from the side of administrative practice. Despite this, I believe that there are no more differences between us now than there were four years ago in assessing the economic processes, although our sociological position and the character of our tasks have changed.

[Horvath] What all of a sudden comes to my mind is the name of Gyorgy Matolcsy who handed in his resignation. He rapidly built the government's Secretariat of Economic Policy into a next-door stronghold to compete with you. Did you have such a good understanding with him, too?

[Suranyi] Regarding principles—because I think this is what you want to know—I think that when people talk about expansion of supply or restriction of demand, they are missing the point. I think an economy must be developed in which supply is encouraged while at the same time demand is kept within limits in order to assure a macrolevel operation. The issue here is not two opposites, but rather the constant assurance of two complementary conditions. Liberalization could have never taken place without sensible restrictions of demand.

[Horvath] We are already talking about theory, and this is natural for you because you have always been known as a researcher and although no one questioned your financial expertise, it is a fact that you never worked in a traditional bank. Did this ever bother you as the bank president?

[Suranyi] True, I never worked in a commercial bank but I spent a year and a half at the World Bank and, as a researcher, I dealt with monetary policy and theoretical questions on inflation for almost ten years. In addition, I was secretary of the committee which prepared and worked out the bank reform in the mid-1980's. Moreover, in the last three years I was active on the board of directors of one of the banks. Thus, this profession is not entirely strange to me. Of course, I do not claim that I was entirely free of anxiety and inhibitions when I came here.

[Horvath] If you felt anxiety and had inhibitions, why did you accept this position? This was surely not the only

option you had. If I am correct, you were preparing to join the IMF when the bank presidency was offered to you.

[Suranyi] This is a very difficult question because undoubtedly it would have been much easier for me to go abroad. But I learned quite a few things in the last two or three years about the workings of the Hungarian economy from a new perspective, on the basis of which I was already convinced in early summer, and I am still convinced that the situation is far from hopeless. Also, I started with a farfetched point. A year ago, when I was still working as state secretary of the Planning Office, no one would have bet a penny on the possibility of improving Hungary's foreign trade balance to the extent that it actually happened. That was the time when the Nemeth administration released the actual data of Hungary's debts and when we closed the year with perhaps the greatest deficit in Hungary's economic history. Just before the national elections, the Nemeth administration was far from being stable. Everyone was questioning the legitimacy of parliamentary representatives but the opposition parties were still outside the parliament. This series of bad omens was coupled with the fact that in the absence of an agreement, our IMF program was interrupted in the summer of 1989. Still, positive changes took place in the first five months of that year largely because society as a whole accepted, and is still forced to accept, tremendous sacrifices. For the first time in a long while, the results of these sacrifices are beginning to be manifest in the improvement of Hungary's foreign trade balance. Thus, one reason why I accepted the bank's offer was that I did not consider the situation hopeless.

[Horvath] Were you so optimistic that you accepted the MNB presidency even without the central-bank law? Weren't you afraid that in such an "interim" situation your role would not and could not be more than financially serving the government?

[Suranyi] Even though indeed no central-bank law exists, a preliminary agreement was made that the de facto regulation of the relationship between the government and the central bank must be carried out in the spirit of the future central-bank law. Everyone has observed this gentleman's agreement in the last six months. Despite all of this, it is not reassuring that presently no legal obstacle stands in the way of a change in which this verbal agreement would be ignored in a given instance. It is not primarily the central bank that is adversely affected by this; it is rather the country's economic and financial balance is put in jeopardy.

[Horvath] The way you put it makes this danger rather vague for those who are not very familiar with the witches' kitchen of economic policy. What sort of news could they hear or read to make them aware that the handwriting on the wall has come to pass?

[Suranyi] Information, for instance, that the central bank should provide credit to various companies and industrial branches by order of the government; more precisely, that it should provide refinancing credits to

various "addressees" on the basis of government decisions? This is where the danger mentioned would present itself in the event that the government would want to take the interest policy in its own hands or even determine individual interest rates, i.e., in case the government would want to try to control the most important elements of financial policy by directly financing the budget over and beyond the extent that we find acceptable, or if it would determine credit export quotas and so forth.... This would mean that money would have to be printed to such an extent that it would speed up inflation to an uncontrollable rate and could in the end push the country into insolvency.

[Horvath] In hearing about these dangers, I understand your optimism less and less. More precisely, I believe that this is what is generally called optimism of the treasury, which in your case is outright mandatory. But it would be good to know whether there is harmony between the picture that you must present to the world and the picture that you have created inside of you.

[Suranyi] It would probably be an inadmissible exaggeration to speak of a perfect harmony, however, I truly see the situation as being better than that which is generally reflected most in the minds of the Hungarian people. The country went through a tremendous change in the last two years and consequently, I believe that the character of today's economy is significantly different from that of three years ago. I admit that the manifestations of this are not perceptible in the everyday lives of most of the population, but thanks to the changes, the conditions for leaving the crisis behind are much better today than they were earlier. Do not misunderstand me; I am not saying that we have come out of the crisis, I am not even saying that the worst of it is over, but I do believe that in terms of being able to come out of the crisis, Hungary is in the best position by far among the Central and East European countries. Incidentally, I believe that it is also natural that a country which must continually use a lot of credit to attract investments, both financial investments and active capital, can scarcely achieve much by constantly licking its wounds. No investor is going to come to us only to hear from morning to night how much we are suffering from tremendous losses. Investors will come here if they find a society which has a healthy self-confidence, which is not entirely poor-spirited, and which has some confidence in the future.

[Horvath] Yes, we frequently hear this even from the government circles, as if trust and self-confidence were a matter of a one-time decision. But returning to the bank, do you have enough self-confidence at your talks with the IMF, for instance, where it is said that the partner with opposite interests does not pay much attention to our characteristics and our situation, and where decisions affecting our lives are often made by applying an inappropriate stereotype to the Hungarian situation?

[Suranyi] When we talk freely with the IMF, we must stand on grounds of cold economic and financial arguments. This means that our talks have been, and will continue to be, characterized by hard and serious debates. As for anything beyond that, I would be very happy if most of our best economists would be as familiar as the IMF's experts are with the Hungarian economic characteristics, operational mechanism, the country's detailed economic indexes, regulatory system, budget structure, financial policy, and the inner congruence of all of these. Several of these experts have been working continuously in Hungary for several years with exceptional intensity. Thus, we are talking about highly qualified experts.

[Horvath] In other words, you endorse cooperation with the IMF at all costs? How would you convince others to do the same?

[Suranyi] I think that since 1982, every time Hungary came to a really difficult situation, it always occurred when talks with the IMF were suspended because, for instance, we thought that we did not need the support of international financial institutions to bring about a change in the economic mechanism. The periods of great crises always happened when the programs, implemented jointly with these institutions were interrupted. Let me mention two specific instances. The first time we did not need the IMF was between 1984 and 1987; we knew best what had to be done. But, strangely enough, Hungary's debt "accidentally" doubled during those three years and we became totally indebted. The second such time was in 1989 when the country produced the greatest balance-of-payments deficit in its entire history. Conversely, when cooperation existed and when we progressed basically in accordance with the conditions of the IMF program, the country's economic situation always improved. This is the way it was between 1982 and 1984, and in 1988, with a definite turn [for the better] in 1990. These are indeed concrete facts.

[Horvath] On the other hand, many people, including leading economists, say that this burden of debts and interests is becoming unbearable and that it is high time for us to "throw in the towel." This was done by Yugoslavia, Poland, Peru, Mexico....

[Suranyi] I strongly disagree with this argument, both as a private person and as an economist—but especially as a banker. Let us look at these examples: Every single country mentioned is in a much more severe crisis than Hungary. It is enough to look at neighboring Poland which indeed has not been paying its debts for ten years, and what results can it show? The living standard is much lower than it was in 1980, and the efficiency of its economy is far below even that of ours. At the same time, the number of unemployed grew to over a million, and inflation is picking up again. And there is little prospect of coming out of this situation. What would be the reason for active capital to enter when in great probability the offer would only be: Bring in your capital but never in your life will you take it out again?

I believe that if we want foreign capital to flow, if we want to modernize, if we want to be connected to the world economy, then we simply cannot afford to lose our solvency. Solvency can only be lost once; it is always followed by a much worse situation. Additionally, in Hungary's case, this would also mean that we would be unable to have normal imports for a long time. We lack enough foreign exchange reserves to pay cash for imports. As for the arguments that "creditors provided loans to the communists and not to us" or "they financed communism and not us, therefore, as a penalty, they should forget or write off the old debts" or "we already paid them off in the form of triple interest rates," well I do not believe that Hungary should sink to such a low level of demagoguery. Without doubt the loans were undertaken in improper ways and for improper purposes, and they were taken out by a thoroughly flawed economic establishment. We still cannot say that we have nothing to do with these debts, not because of pride or proper manners but because of well-understood self-interest.

[Horvath] Is the situation really so much a question of "either or?" Is there not some kind of a "gray zone" between paying off everything at all cost and paying off nothing?

[Suranyi] Presently, I believe that there is none. In order to even begin talks on certain easier terms we would need a significantly stronger economy, i.e., larger foreign exchange reserves or a higher level of convertibility for the forint, for example. But this has yet to be the question.

Death Struggle of State Enterprise Described

91CH0304C Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
15 Jan 91 p 9

[Article by Laszlo L. Muranyi, including interview with Imre Sarkozi; place and date of interview not given: "The Director Has Already Been Relieved; Will the Ganz-Danubius Ship Go Under?"—first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] The death of the Ganz Danubius Crane and Machine Factory Ltd. of Tiszafured actually began at birth. But this play on words here is much more than a cliche, it is a merciless reality. Of course only in this case does its present prospect of bankruptcy materialize.

There is no work in the factory, there are no orders to fill, and closing the gates and putting 800 people on the street would be almost catastrophic in a region that is already facing serious problems of unemployment. It would be entirely hopeless for them to find jobs. Knowing the situation in Hungary, even moving and changing one's livelihood can also be very difficult.

A Hopeless Beginning

Understandably, there are great tensions within the factory gates. It seems that the workers are increasingly

united in mutiny against their director; unequivocally demanding his resignation at the workers' meeting held just before Christmas. All of this would perhaps be acceptable and explainable in this situation, in case the director's ineptness is actually proven, save the increasingly rough methods. Director Imre Sarkozi told me that during the past weeks unidentified persons have repeatedly broken the windows of his Tiszafured home and his family has received threatening phone calls demanding that he voluntarily relinquish the company's executive chair.

In order to understand the factory's long agony, let us go back two or two and a half years, to the time when it became an independent joint stock company. By 1988 the renowned and long-standing Ganz Danubius Ship and Crane Factory ended up facing an unavoidable bankruptcy. Director General Adam Angyal had only one alternative at that time to resolve the situation: He managed to make the company's six factories operate independently.

However, the Tiszafured plant had absolutely no chance of survival by itself. The enormous disadvantage suffered at the start because of its product profile, which was built mainly on the Soviet market, and its unfavorable geographic location could have only been offset during the last two years by very high quality production, hard and expert marketing, and a great deal of luck. It seems, however, that they lacked all the above—until now.

Incidentally, changing the factory into a joint stock company happened in an ambiguous way in 1988, and this ambiguity proved to set the stage. No new co-owner who could have provided significant capital for steering the factory on a new course could be found. The enterprise asset management center remained the primary owner among the smaller share buyers who brought in only a few million, although the center, under Adam Angyal's continued direction, handed over shares of significant value to the State Development Institute in lieu of earlier debts. Yet hardly any capital was available during the change. The earlier owners did not even provide the factory with the circulating capital needed from the start. As compensation for the raw materials and semifinished products that remained, the people of Tiszafured would have had to pay 320 million forints to the asset management center, but half of that sum is still outstanding, burdening the factory as a hopeless debt.

Search for a Scapegoat

This is how it was in the beginning, and the present is similar. There has been little, if any work for months, most of the workers continually stay home for 80 percent of their wages, and the joint stock company's owners have been continuously contemplating a shutdown since the summer. The malcontents claim that the number one cause of the failure is Executive President Imre Sarkozi. They say he is not a strong enough leader, lacks expertise, and that during these two years he has not done enough

for the safety and survival of the factory. In the days just before Christmas, all of this culminated in the crowded workers' meeting where the director was called upon to resign.

Correspondence and accusations continued practically throughout the year until the Christmas petition that demanded the ousting of the director. The director's reply makes it clear to the observer that he was hesitant and indecisive throughout in handling the conflict, as if he believed that by ignoring the action launched against him and the atmosphere around him they would disappear by themselves. Well, they did not.

"If you have read through the letters written to me or against me during the last year," the director began with an almost automatic reflexlike defensive when I requested an analysis of the situation from him immediately after Christmas, "then you can see that they mostly include everyday tactical issues. Abolish the personnel department, decrease the size of the administrative staff, implement this or that kind of structural change, increase wages.... Well, these are not the main issues! Two years ago, there were two requirements for the plant's survival and these remain our primary concerns of highly strategic importance even today, namely, we must have continuous work and the plant must not lose its solvency."

[Sarkozi] It was indeed possible to stay afloat for two years under your direction. But your opposition claims that during this time the situation not only failed to stabilize, but it culminated in the present failure. They claim that the factory has no stable product profile and no work, and from looking at the results, it is difficult to refute their claim. Two years ago we were left here by ourselves, without a single person with expertise in conducting business. In the absence of anyone more qualified, I was the one who began with market research and with seeking out orders, and there is one thing for which not even my enemies can reproach me: We had orders until last October, and we were able to stay afloat for two years through the one-time orders for steel structures that I acquired. It is another matter that, despite all my efforts, I was unable to find a capitalist partner who would have permanently resolved the situation with his money and last but not least, his business connections, even though I talked with more than thirty Western partners during these two years with such privatization in mind. These are the main issues here, not which interest group within the plant would like to see which person in the position of head of department or chief engineer at a given time.

Waiting for a Successor

[Muranyi] Is it possible that in dealing with the main issues, you neglected the everyday affairs, the end result being that in addition to the strategic failures, everyday problems also surfaced and intensified?

[Sarkozi] Most of my time and energy were indeed tied down by the former. I thought that what was left to be

done was "merely" to produce and that I could entrust my colleagues to take care of that. But the struggle for the redistribution of management positions began in the spring, and members of the management either sided with the influential groups or simply became more cautious and began using tactics. My opponents are right in that I was too lenient. My most tenacious opponents of today are precisely the ones against whom I should have taken energetic measures. This factory suffered the most from the increasingly loud voices of outside spectators. Unfortunately, my colleagues in the management also joined this process and I was left alone. But these things, I stress again, are merely secondary.

It seems that life itself is going to resolve the case of the Tiszafured director. It is not going to save the plant but it will release personal tensions. The executive's commission will terminate at the end of the calendar year and with the help of a "headhunter" firm, the selection of a successor is already in progress. Mr. Sarkozi did not apply for the job. He says that only a person who can bring capital to Tiszafured would be able to fight in the hope of success for the plant's survival, even at the risk that the new owner may steer the firm into an entirely different branch.

At any rate, Imre Sarkozi, who will supposedly remain in office until the balance sheet is completed, will have to carry out one more unpopular task of the future crisis manager: In accordance with the resolution made at the joint stock company's 14 December general meeting, he is compelled to reduce the plant's labor force by 50 percent. At the expense of laying off 400 people, the factory gates will not have to be closed in February.

POLAND

Danes To Cofound Technological Institute

91P20212A Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 28 Jan 91 p II 3

[Article by Uffe Gardel: "Polish Institute Gets Help From Denmark"—first paragraph is BERLINGSKE TIDENDE introduction]

[Text] The Danish Technological Institute will be a cofounder of a Polish technological institute. Denmark can contribute with management training and assistance with implementation.

Poland's new market economy will receive Danish aid to establish a type of Polish technological institute.

The Danish Institute of Technology (DTI) has joined with the Polish Government and a number of Polish institutions of higher learning to found "Progress & Business," a nonprofit organization which will help Polish industry with both research and courses in technology and management.

The cooperative agreement was signed last Friday at Jagiello University in Krakow. In addition to the university, which is one of the oldest in Europe, participants from the Polish side include the Ministry of Industry, the Academy of Mining and Metallurgy, the Council for the Chemical Industry, and the private consultant firm ALPHA. DTI expects to be able to contribute, in particular, knowledge concerning the founding of new businesses, licensing, and management training. The plan is that Progress & Business will establish an educational network between various educational institutions in Poland and abroad.

DTI is represented on the Progress & Business governing board by Professor Morten Knudsen, the commissioner at DTI and the former director of the Technological Institute.

Silesian Bank: Contacts With France, Italy
91EP0225A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 27 Dec 90 p II

[Article by Barbara Cieszewska: "On Katowice's Wall Street"]

[Text] Already on the third day of the operations of the new, private bank in Katowice, it was clearly apparent how very badly these types of institutions are needed. On the main floor of the Upper Silesia Economic Bank Company—because that is who we are talking about—a crowd of prospective clients is waiting. Because this is a bank for the average individual, for people who want to conduct business for themselves. For this, they need credit, and it is precisely this bank which intends to grant this credit quickly and on favorable terms. The members of the board say that if a client applies for credit and has all of the necessary documents with him he might even receive it the same day. Let us hope that these are not simply initial statements.

The Upper Silesia Economic Bank, which began operations, as good Western practice dictates, on the first working day of the New Year, i.e., 2 January, truly is the largest private bank in Poland, as announced in the television news. It is not only the largest in terms of the floor space it occupies—it covers an entire floor in a downtown building—but also in terms of the number of stockholders. There are exactly 748 of them and they own 64,000 shares, with a nominal value of 250,000 zlotys each.

The first requirement of the founders of the bank, i.e., the members of the Upper Silesia Economic Society, was that this be a private bank. Over 53 percent of the stock is in private hands and almost 47 percent is distributed among state firms. It is hoped that at least some of them will be privatized.

The private shareholders, for the most part, purchased between five shares, because that was the minimum, and 10 shares. Among the private shareholders are three people who bought 4,500 to 5,500 shares. There are

444 private shareholders and it is they, according to the board members, who constitute the strength of the board.

All of the test runs and simulation accounts indicate that the bank should obtain good, and even very good, profits. It is anticipated that the dividend declared at the end of the accounting year will be larger than the interest on one-year deposits. Already in midyear, the bank intends to issue stock which can be bought and sold.

The initial concentration was on three areas of activities. The bank gives credit to natural and legal persons. It gives it in return for collateral or a pledge, for a mortgage [or] insurance; hence, the bank intends to open a branch of Westa State Insurance Office, and in the future will set up its own insurance department. It also accepts deposits of capital carrying an interest rate depending upon the term. Most popular are three-month deposits.

The bank handles current accounts for natural and legal persons. It plans to expand steadily, hence a branch will soon be established in Jastrzebie, and after that, in Trzebin, which will be the first bank in that little town.

Contacts are being established with the West, mainly with France and Italy. Do they fear competition, from the banks on the same street, the Silesian Bank and the Polish Savings Banks? Almost in one voice they reply "no", because banking, as everyone knows, is an almost virginal, still undeveloped territory. There is enough work for everyone who wants it. At the Upper Silesian Bank they say outright that it would be fine if it were finally possible to realize the prewar concept of making Warsaw Street, one of the main streets in the center of the city, a Katowice Wall Street.

Trade With Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan Proposed

91EP0234A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish
No 113, 4 Dec 90 p 8

[Article by Maciej Tekielski: "Direct Cooperation With Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan"]

[Text] Recently, a Polish economic and trade mission headed by Dariusz Ledworowski, deputy minister of economic cooperation with foreign countries, visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The goal of this visit, prepared by the Bureau of the Commercial Attaché in Moscow, was to establish direct cooperation with the two republics in the aspects of ensuring the supply of important raw materials and gaining markets for the sale of goods. In addition, draft agreements on economic cooperation were presented. Previously, Poland has undertaken such initiatives with Russia, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic republics.

An initiative involving direct cooperation on the basis of general agreements was approved in both Tashkent and Alma-Ata. Respective contracts will be signed after work is done by experts. However, this will certainly not happen very soon because the creation of a foreign-trade

infrastructure is at an early stage in both republics. In both of them, committees for foreign economic relations which play the role of ministries of foreign trade of sorts have already been formed. Local foreign-trade enterprises already exist, as well as the concepts for expanding their sectoral subdivisions. Banks licensed to engage in foreign-currency operations are also being created there from branches of the Bank for Foreign Economic Relations which have operated there to date. A lack of currency reserves is also a common feature of both these republics for the time being. This is why their mutual trade with Poland should be based on barter and compensation arrangements.

Both republics have participated to a considerable degree in trade with Poland through centralized arrangements. However, their participation in this trade was not always precisely known to us. Therefore, the mission was significant not only because it initiated direct contacts but also because it discovered the needs of our partners which Polish enterprises may meet.

Ensuring the deliveries of cotton next year in amounts meeting the needs of our industry was the most significant result of the visit to Uzbekistan. A contract for the first quarter is almost ready. In return for cotton, we will, at least in part, deliver mutton which Uzbekistan is interested in purchasing, and is an export of our breeders. The fact that we have never succeeded in exporting mutton to the Soviet Union makes this transaction particularly significant. Even recently our offers made to Moscow were left without a response.

This is likely to be transacted within a barter arrangement. However, these may be companion transactions which are settled for in foreign-currency cash because a central fund is supposed to be formed to which a segment of export proceeds is to be transferred (it is proposed that 40 percent will be). In this case, Uzbekistan will have to sell us a correspondingly greater amount of cotton in order to obtain currency for both the mutton and the payment to the central fund. Similar transactions are expected in the future.

In addition, Uzbekistan is interested in deliveries of sugar and other foodstuffs. On this occasion, it turned out that a considerable segment of light industry operates in Uzbekistan (likewise in Kazakhstan) using Polish equipment from Befama and Wifama, and this industry is interested in purchasing more machinery.

The inquiries of our mission revealed the languor of light industry and the foreign trade organizations representing it. Had their representatives embarked on developing these markets earlier they probably could have managed to purchase cotton for delivery this year instead of buying it nervously in other countries. We also learned that Uzbekistan is prepared to sell cotton in exchange for yarn and fabrics because its processing capacity is insufficient for meeting its own needs for this merchandise. This would have made it possible to draw down the stocks on which Lodz is choking. As can be seen, at

present we cannot restrict our commercial contacts to all-union foreign trade organizations; we should do field work more vigorously and acquire markets in individual republics.

Incidentally, it is not easy to come across the representatives of old and experienced foreign-trade organizations over there; however, a multitude of our private companies operate there. They sell, for example, cosmetics or electronic equipment, taking advantage of the last months ruble-denominated trade.

In Kazakhstan, much interest was shown in our machines for the light and food industries. The desire was expressed to cooperate in strictly defined areas of agricultural production, such as sugar beet planting, seeds, and potatoes. We have received offers concerning equipment for producing construction materials, a lot of which is in operation in this region. A specific list of needed equipment, machinery, and spare parts was provided. Among other things, desirable grades of marble were offered within the framework of the same ministry.

Kazakhstan would also be prepared to purchase foodstuffs—mutton, sugar, and powdered milk, i.e., precisely the items we do not lack. Offers have been made, and contracts will be signed soon.

Therefore, many different goods can be sold in these republics. Certainly, it is going to be more difficult to find products for bartering. These markets should be acquired anew. After all, the industrialists of Lodz had a presence and procured cotton there. Therefore, we should carry on these traditions. These markets also provide opportunities for enterprises of the machine-building industry whose assortments have slim chances of being sold on the Soviet market in the future under currency-denominated trade. Drying installations are a case in point; we have supplied several hundred, out of which only several ended up in these republics. Meanwhile, their needs come to between 50 and 100 pieces. This also applies to [grain] silos and elevators.

It is planned to set up trade representation offices in both republics. In Kazakhstan a consulate general will be set up, and a trade consulate might be organized together with it. A numerous and energetic Polish community operates there. In Uzbekistan, it will be some form of a trade mission. However, regardless of this, the enterprises interested should dispatch their own people who would work the local market there. Several enterprises together could set up such an enterprise, or center, jointly, if need be under the auspices of the Polish-Soviet Chamber of Industry and Commerce which could also ensure promotion activities.

It is necessary to step up the activities of enterprises, all the more so because barter transactions require more preparation and are more labor intensive. It is necessary to understand that the more a given enterprise is in a position to buy, the more it will be able to sell there. We

will also need to work in these markets the way Western companies, for example, Austrian, operated in our country at one time.

The issue of settlements for such transactions arises; it is particularly important given expensive credit. Textil-impex will have to organize the procurement and deliveries of mutton in such a manner as to bring them closer in time to the deliveries of cotton, or, if the dates of delivery differ, figure the cost of credit into prices. The enterprises interested should arrange financing because we do not have a specialized bank.

Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are being scouted a lot by foreign companies from the United States, France, Canada, and Germany. Chevron has already secured a concession for oil production in Kazakhstan, and Canada has made an offer to cooperate in the field of grains. Conditions for growing them are almost identical in the two regions. Contacts have already been established with American businessmen regarding cooperation in agriculture, processing, and storage, with French companies in garments production, and also with China, Yugoslavia, and Japan.

Uzbekistan has signed a letter of intent with Indonesia on cooperation in, among others, the silk industry. Tashkent-Kompetent, a joint enterprise with Indian participation, engages in remodeling and building hotels. Cooperation with China has been undertaken in metallurgy, engineering, and technology. Three organizations have been set up jointly with Italy in order to develop, implement, and coordinate a general strategy of development of industry, agriculture, trade, science, and culture. It is planned to open shops [selling goods] for foreign currency and rubles, to build vegetable-processing plants using Italian technology, and to modernize a footwear and hide-processing factory.

The economic mission uncovered new markets which, however, were acquired indirectly a long time ago. Everything is now up to foreign trade enterprises which must undertake vigorous acquisition activities because competition is keen. This cannot be done from behind a desk in Warsaw, Lodz, or even Moscow.

Commentary on Changes in New Communications Law

91EP0236A Warsaw *RZECZPOSPOLITA* (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 15 Jan 91 p IV

[Interview with Stefan Ciesla, director of the Legal Department in the Ministry of Communications, by Ryszard Andziak; place and date not given: "The Post, Radio, Telephones—Their New Look as of Today"]

[Text] [Andziak] This very day, 15 January, the new Law on Communications (its complete text was published in *RZECZPOSPOLITA* on 27 December) is taking effect. Which of its provisions do you think to be most important?

[Ciesla] Above all, the possibility of demonopolizing telecommunications by basing the relationship between telecommunications and its clients on the Civil Law Code. Previously that code was hardly applied in this respect, and provisions of administrative law counted much more. One effect of that approach had been infamous provisions of the internal manual of the Polish Post, Telephone, and Telegraph Enterprise—declared invalid and unlawful by the Constitutional Tribunal—under which arbitrary decisions could be made on the sequence in which telephones could be allocated. Basing contractual relations on the Civil Law Code makes it possible, once the normal procedure for pursuing a claim is exhausted, to file a claim with a court of law, in every individual case.

[Andziak] The deadline for transforming the PPTT [Polish Post, Telegraph, and Telephone] Enterprise into the Poczta Polska [Polish Postal Service] Enterprise and Polish Telecommunications Company, was fixed at 31 December 1991.

[Ciesla] In the intervening time the assets can be inventoried, appraised, and distributed. During the distribution it will be necessary to determine the legal titles to many premises occupied by post offices. A procedure for utilizing shared assets which it is not physically possible to subdivide also should be determined. These are only a few examples of the tremendous amount of work involved. A similar distribution of the assets of the postal service in Great Britain took about 18 years, and in the FRG 20 years. We have only one year to carry out thorough changes. Besides, the World Bank made granting credit for the development of telecommunications conditional on their physical isolation from the existing structure.

[Andziak] The law has been passed, but the implementing regulations have not yet been issued.

[Ciesla] The EEC has promised help from its experts in drafting such regulations. Some already exist in international agreements. I think that they will be ready by the end of March.

[Andziak] What can be expected by people who have been waiting years to get their own telephones?

[Ciesla] The law itself cannot cure our telecommunications overnight. Several years will be needed before the effects of the new regulations will be felt, although in some places improvements may occur within several months. [Andziak] Where?

[Ciesla] For example in Warsaw. At present the old telephone exchanges are being replaced, while at the same time the installation of a cellular telephone network, which will serve to increase the number of subscribers, is commencing. This growth imbues us with optimism and hope for improvements in the situation, for interesting foreign capital in the possibilities for investing in Poland.

[Andziak] The new law permits not only the Polish Telecommunications Company but also other entities to provide telephone or telegraph services on a profit-making basis.

[Ciesla] The commencement of such activities requires granting an operating license by the minister of communications. Such licenses may be granted to entities which, on the basis of separate regulations—e.g., the Law on Private Enterprise, or the Law on Joint Ventures—may operate on the territory of the Republic of Poland. On the other hand, licenses for the provision of international telecommunications services cannot be granted, since these are provided exclusively by Polish Telecommunications Company.

[Andziak] What about interurban services?

[Ciesla] They may be provided by joint ventures on condition that the share of foreign capital in the operating or share capital does not exceed 49 percent.

[Andziak] Is there now a chance for creating an efficient telephone system?

[Ciesla] Of the shortfall of about 10 million telephones until the year 2000 the postal service and, following the conversion, Polish Telecommunications may install one-half and the remainder will have to be installed by somebody else. Hence the new law contains provisions enabling other entities, and not just the PPTT, to install and operate telecommunications networks, lines, and facilities and to provide services. On the basis of a plan for allocating station identification numbers, the minister of communications will be able to allocate such numbers to entities applying for licenses to operate telecommunications networks. The entities thus applying may be the same entities as those which under new law have the right to apply for a license to provide telecommunications services. In conformity with the policy he adopts, the minister of communications may announce auctions for the allocation of station identification numbers in specified regions of the country.

[Andziak] So we can expect competition to appear.

[Ciesla] The issue is not so much that of competition as of making up for the shortage of networks and facilities. We expect that most of the new owners-operators will be various local joint-stock companies formed e.g., from community committees for promoting the spread of telephone networks in rural areas, which will bring about the installation of telephones in the areas inhabited by share owners. But, as for normal competition, such as exists in EC countries, that can arise when providing all kinds of additional services ensuing from combinations of computer engineering and telephone networks. I refer to videoconferencing, data transmission, data retrieval systems, and electronic mail systems. This requires, however, the development of digital communications.

[Andziak] The new owners-operators will charge exorbitant fees for providing services to the public, will they not?

[Ciesla] The minister of communications may impose a ceiling on fees for telecommunications services provided to the public, with penalties for exceeding that ceiling.

[Andziak] Are you not apprehensive that all kinds of cheap equipment that cannot work when interconnected will enter this country and the quality of the connections will not prove any better?

[Ciesla] To preserve uniform network standards the new law requires official certification by the minister of communications of all the telecommunications systems installed and operated in this country. While this law was being drafted, that particular provision met with considerable resistance from interest groups, because it restricts the influx of shoddy foreign terminal equipment such as the telephones, fax machines, and answering machines which are sold without official certification, not just by street vendors but also in state-owned stores. Modern dial exchanges serve to identify the users of such equipment, who will then be penalized by its forfeiture, a fine, or imprisonment.

[Andziak] Will new private stations resembling "Radio Z" arise?

[Ciesla] The ministry has received about 1,000 applications for licenses to operate radio-communications equipment, which involve the allocation of specific frequencies whose number is, as known, limited. That is why, in the event that it is not possible to allocate frequencies to all the applicants, the minister of communications may announce an allocation contest in cooperation with the minister of culture and art, whose approval is always required when operating radio-communications equipment designed to broadcast public radio or television programs. The requirement of approval by both ministers is a consequence of the abolition of monopoly on information-transmission equipment, given the existing monopoly on the creation of broadcasts. That is because, pursuant to the Law on the Committee for Radio and Television, only that committee may prepare public broadcasts. This situation may change only after a new law on radio and television is passed.

[Andziak] What about the new radio stations?

[Ciesla] They operate on an experimental basis, with the approval of the chairman of the Radio Committee.

[Andziak] Who may apply for frequency allocations?

[Ciesla] Individuals and legal entities which apply for a license to operate telecommunications equipment. I wish to stress that all the individual decisions of the minister of communications are administrative decisions consonant with the code of administrative proceedings; they must have a plausible rationale and may be appealed to the Superior Administrative Court.

The installation and operation of radio-communications equipment by the Catholic Church with the object of broadcasting radio and television programs outside the normal network are regulated by an agreement reached between the minister of communications and the Secretariat of the Conference of the Episcopate of Poland.

[Andziak] Does the communications law provide for the possibility of the performance of postal services by entities other than the Poczta Polska?

[Ciesla] What the new law defines as postal services, that is, the conveyance and delivery of postal matter in return for fees warranting a profitable operation and the sending and delivery of postal money orders, belong in the exclusive domain of the Poczta Polska enterprise. Other entities may, on the basis of permits granted by the minister of communications, engage in the conveyance of letters and parcels, that is, in activities permitted by the Law on Private Enterprise, but without the right to employ the designation "postal mail conveyance services." They may be courier companies, delivery companies, etc., but they may not call themselves postal services. The name "poczta" [postal services] is under law reserved exclusively for the Poczta Polska enterprise.

[Andziak] This is creating a kind of legal fiction.

[Ciesla] But it has its justification. That is because only a postal receipt, that is, a receipt from a unit of Poczta Polska, has the power of an official document, which may often be of great importance. For example, when a written statement of claim or defense in a court action is dispatched through a post office, the supposition is that it was filed in advance of its deadline, as if recorded in the daybook of a court. Jan Kowalski's [private] "Postal Service" may not accept such a responsibility.

[Andziak] Private entrepreneurs may select the best regions for mail services.

[Ciesla] The licenses for the conveyance of mail will specify the areas in which that conveyance may be performed, that is, they will protect Poczta Polska against the usurpation by private carriers of the most lucrative mail routes.

State Railroad in Need of Drastic Reform

Tonnage Transport Dropping

91EP0237A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 15 Jan 91 p III

[Article by (K.Sz.): "State Railroads in 1990: Hardly a Good Record"]

[Text] Last December was pretty good to the railroad workers, compared with the previous months, but, even so, it was worse than December 1989. The PKP [Polish State Railroads] carried a total of 21.4 million metric tons of freight, or 71 percent of the total carried in December 1989. The volume of hauls of metals and

metal products and fertilizers has shrunk in particular. Freight in transit, too, has decreased.

For 1990 as a whole the Polish State Railroads carried 277.2 million metric tons of freight, i.e., as much as 105.7 million metric tons less than in 1989. These statistics merit hardly any comment; it suffices simply to compare them and the conclusions are self-apparent. There can be only one inference: freight volume has declined by one-third but the numbers of railroad personnel remained the same. Management also has not changed; no decision has been taken to begin streamlining the enterprise. In view of this it is not surprising that the railroad workers feel threatened.

In 1990, compared with 1989, the volume of hauls of black coal declined by 27 million metric tons; sand and gravel, by 10.6 million tons; stone, by 9.7 million tons; metals and metal products, by 7.5 million tons; and fertilizers, by 7 million tons. The volume of freight carried in transit [across Poland] decreased by nearly 2 million tons.

Budget Problems Viewed

91EP0237B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 15 Jan 91 p II

[Article by Krzysztof Szczesniak: "Lack of Reforms Engenders Feeling of Hopelessness: State Railroad Nearing Bankruptcy"]

[Text] It is now as plain as day that no more delays can be brooked. It is time to decide whether the railroad is to prosper on its own by becoming a commercial enterprise, with all the consequences this involves, or to continue to subsist on a miserly dole from the state. Intermediate solutions also are possible. But in one way or another, speaking in general, the state must simply formulate some definite transportation policy.

Throughout the world, and especially in West Europe, the railroads are viewed as a valuable means of transportation for the future, chiefly owing to considerations of environmental protection and low energy consumption. As a result, the economic effectiveness of rail transport compared with motor transport stands at a minimum in a ratio of one to 20 or, according to some other calculations, even as much as one to 30 [as published]. Thus, the role of the railroads should not be downgraded. On the contrary, on determining clear rules of the game, it can be expected that precisely the railroads will become a factor streamlining the domain of transportation and indirectly also of the entire economy.

For the time being, under the binding Law dated 27 April 1989 on the PKP [Polish State Railroads] Enterprise, "the railroad was created with the object of meeting the needs of the population and the national economy, and also of national defense and national security." Such a formulation is nowadays an evident anachronism. Likewise the economic and financial system underlying the operation of the Polish State Railroads is an anachronism and does not at all fit the present situation. Suffice just one comparison

here: freight rates are determined by the minister of transportation in consultation with the minister of finance, because these are official prices, but the prices of a majority of materials, and hence also the cost, are regulated by the market law of supply and demand.

Thus there is nothing surprising in that overall expenditures on [rail] transport exceed revenues by 16 percent. The difference has to be offset from the State Budget—from where else?—even though it, itself, is being squeezed. For this year that difference amounts to 5.5 trillion zlotys [Z], of which Z2.7 trillion in subsidies for unprofitable passenger hauls and Z2.8 trillion in subsidies for the repair and maintenance of the technical, economic, and social infrastructure.

That Z5.5 trillion is not enough. The railroads asked for Z7.7 trillion, but the chances of their getting it are poor. Thus, Z5.5 trillion can be anticipated, and this will enable the PKP to earn a "profit" of Z1.1 trillion zlotys in 1991. Out of that amount it will be necessary to pay a 40-percent sales tax, plus 45 percent to the Labor Fund and the Social Security Administration, with 8.5 percent to be earmarked for the bonus fund. What remains is pennies, not enough, for the third year in a row, to expand or modernize the railroads in any way. It is at least well that the state is giving a subsidy for the infrastructure; last year it gave Z720 billion and for this year it wants to give only Z457 billion.

As this depressing comparison indicates, there is hardly any money for raising pension payments. Wages are calculated as a cost element, and the plan for 1991 earmarks Z6.7 trillion for this purpose. This means in practice Z1.7 million zlotys per employee. Last December this average amounted to Z1.2 million or 85.3 percent of the nationwide average for five branches of the economy. It unfortunately is not possible to predict how these figures will compare in 1991 (a year later), after every average railroad worker gets his half a million more.

Besides, this is of no great importance considering that these figures are of a purely academic nature. That is because any considerations of the financial status of the PKP hinge on the wage-increase tax [tax on exceeding the wage-increase ceiling] it had paid last year. Recent calculations show that the PKP will have to pay Z2.3 trillion in wage-increase taxes for that miserable Z1.2 million per railroad worker. When the sales tax (Z400 billion) is added, it turns out that the PKP has to pay Z2.7 trillion into the State Budget, whereas the adjusted profit for last year totaled only Z1 trillion.

In other words, the railroad is Z1.7 trillion in the red. Such is the deficit of this company, which would have resulted in its bankruptcy had it been an ordinary company, a not indispensable one.

It is difficult to anticipate the government's moves in face of the strike threat. But whatever it may do, it is clear that half-measures will not resolve the problem. The Polish State Railroads will have to be switched onto a new track, because the wage demands are only the tip of the iceberg. The principal cause of unrest on the railroads is the lack of reforms and the ensuing hopelessness.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Returning Emigre on Future of Czech Culture

91CH0313A Prague TVORBA in Czech
16 Jan 91 pp 5-6

[Interview with Professor Eduard Goldstuecker by Ivana Vizdalova during the first half of December 1990; place not given: "Clouds Over Culture"]

[Text] The former head of the department of German studies at Charles University, the former chairman of the Union of Writers, Prof. Eduard Goldstuecker, is returning to his homeland following his second exile. He is returning to a country which is also seeking the way back—to Europe. In a complicated manner, sometimes confused. And the way in which this process is seen by a person whose vision has been sharpened by an involuntary separation of many years—that is the principal topic of our visit.

[Vizdalova] Professor, thanks to its geographical location, the land of the Czechs has always been at the crossroads of European roads. It thus belongs to the Central European complex. Do you recognize the concept of a Central European culture? And if so, how would you outline it? At the same time, what is your opinion of the inclusion of Czech culture, following World War II, into the European context and what are its prospects in this direction?

[Goldstuecker] Czechs, the Czech nation, its culture, the country which they occupy, undoubtedly belong to Europe. Central Europe is a term which I understand to mean all of that which lies between Germany and Austria, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and to the Black Sea. This area is home to a number of small or smaller nations, whose territories frequently overlap so that it is difficult to outline any ethnic or religious borders. This gives rise also to the constant and endemic minority problem. And it accounts for the imbalance of these nations among themselves. As well as the fact that this minority problem results in foreign external powers being able to manipulate one against the other, as has occurred throughout history more than once.

Culture, that is to say, Central European culture, does not coincide, however, with the territory which I have outlined. Part of it is also the culture of Germany and, of course, Austria.

It is also possible to rightfully speak about a special Central European culture because it involves the cultural production of nations which are neither culturally West European nor culturally East European. It is a culture based on the fate of these nations. All of them experienced long periods of national oppression, national lack of freedom. All have had experiences which were not even experienced by the Russians, by the French, or by the British....

As far as Czech culture is concerned, I do not know whether many people in Bohemia, in Moravia, and in Silesia (in order to be complete with respect to those hyphens) realize that the current situation which carries so much promise also carries with it certain dangers. The danger that the Czech nation is once more confronted with the question whether it is worthwhile to strive for national independence or whether it would be better to give in to the new pressures which are coming today in the new situation and to, perhaps, become integrated with the Germans? These questions have had to be faced several times in modern history. This question has always confronted the Czechs, the Czech people, since the time of White Mountain. It kept on recurring and has become topical today again. I am not sure that many people realize the full extent of it, but they should. Is it worthwhile to fight, to strive for the preservation of ethnic independence or do we let it go for the promise of perhaps an immediately improved material status? In my opinion, this is the basic question facing the cultural decisions of today.

Moreover, culture, the cultural creations of every ethnic or any kind of other entity, society, reflect the life of that collective, society, or nation, no matter how distilled or fragmented this reflection may be. In my judgment, and I dare judge as a person who stands at least a little aside, but whose heart is in it, Czech culture will reflect the everyday life here, and that everyday life seems to me to be terribly and unfavorably impacted by dreadful experiences which the nation went through over the past 50 years. Our publicists speak primarily only of 40 years, as though the Nazis had never existed, yet the principal trauma which this nation suffered begins with Munich. Since that period, the nation did not have time to recover because after Munich, following that dreadful treachery on the part of allies and friends, came the Hitler occupation, six years of Nazism, which set as its goal the removal of Czechs from this German "lebensraum." And then, a mere three years later, with the new promise of spring, came 40 years of Stalinist dictatorship.

In 50 years of traumatic experiences, everyday life in this country became very impoverished and coarse. People, who were threatened in their survival prospects, quite naturally and logically became more egotistical. This can be seen in small and even in tiny signs. Go walk the streets, say, walk down Wenceslas Square, and people barely get out of each other's way, everyone goes their own way, let the other person move. They do not have sufficient consideration for others; they pursue only their own interests.

If we wish to speak of the blossoming of Czech culture, then such manifestations must be eliminated. Everyday life must become more cultural, if not before, then at least simultaneously with the development of cultural creation. The culture of life...look here, my wife and I have now come to arrange our move. We stand in queues virtually the entire day. If this society is to catch up with Europe, something that is constantly talked about, it

must organize a new system of life in the country. After all, the system which still prevails here today is the old Austro-tsaristic system. Moreover, it is characterized by Nazism and the terrible dictatorship of the Stalinists and Brezhnevists. You know, it is not enough to purchase computers or to send people abroad for training (those talents exist here)—and there will be many engineers, and good ones—all of that is not enough as long as the system of regulations pertaining to the citizen and his life is not changed.

The system of regulations must change in the direction of greater confidence on the part of officialdom toward the citizen. The existing system of endless regulations is what leads to those long lines at government offices and is based on the lack of confidence in the citizen. The person in power, regardless of who he may be, sees the citizen as a potential swindler rather than an honest person. Given the existence of such a system, it is not possible to speak of modernization, of real modernization, even in the face of the largest number of computers.

Unprecedented things are occurring. Imagine, if you will, that the transfer of money from the Commercial Bank, located at Naprikope No. 14, to the Zivnostenska Bank, located on the same street at No. 20, takes a month. How do you want to make this out to be a modern society, how do you intend to catch up with Europe with such ways? Moreover, if you wish to deposit your money in that bank, you must stand in line and prove who you are rather than that they should prove that they are worthy of confidence if I am entrusting my money to them. All of this is a system established on the principle of exercised supervision over the citizen, oversight over the overseers, and oversight over the overseers of overseers. To remove and rectify this is a great cultural task which must be fulfilled in order to open room for a new cultural life. And in order to catch up with Europe.

[Vizdalova] The longing for a return to Europe also encompasses tendencies for returning to other factors. They are a sort of reaction to the previous rejections and sometimes lead to excessive euphoria. Specifically, I have in mind all types of peripatetic developments involved in the acceptance or the specific rejection of the works of Franz Kafka....

[Goldstuecker] You know, among us Czechs, the lack of interest in Kafka was sort of natural. We simply did not have a relationship with him. It is not generally known that the first wave of acceptance for the works of Kafka among Czech readers was carried by Communist officials. Milena Jesenska, who translated his works, published her translations in journals directed primarily by S.K. Neumann. This ended with Kafka's death in 1924. After the war, Pavel Eisner wrote a study entitled "Kafka and Prague." However, he was unsuccessful in getting it published as a book. Similarly, even publisher Vaclav Petr, who intended to publish a compendium of Kafka's writings, also did not succeed. We know what happened next. From the standpoint of Stalinist criteria, Kafka

became the carrier of all that which was opposed to the principles of socialist realism. At that, he was the most widely discussed writer in the West as early as the 1950's.

When I became head of the department of German studies at Charles University, I aimed the program activities of the department at researching the German literature of Prague. This even gave rise to a proposal to convene an international conference of Marxists which was supposed to discuss the question as to whether the reproofs laid at Kafka's door from the standpoint of socialist realism could withstand critical examination. Following the Brezhnev occupation, the Kafka conference was designated as the beginning of a counterrevolution and I was called its intellectual originator. However, this was not the end of the series of absurdities. The collapse of Stalinism occurred and all of a sudden I hear the criticism that I was the one who had dragged Kafka into Communist ideology at that time. As I say, it is an absurdity.... Well, and now, with the advent of beautiful and inspiring freedom, there is the danger that we will go to the other extreme, that we shall again drag this Kafka to death and that we shall commercialize him to such an extent that we will earn the ridicule of the cultural world. We have Kafka and so we shall go to market with him everywhere wherever this is possible or not. I had large reservations when I heard that a Kafka Center is being established which is supposed to manufacture memorabilia, souvenirs for tourists, etc., under the name of Kafka.

[Vizdalova] Professor, our state is currently solving a troublesome economic situation. For the time being, it is solving it in such a way that the postrevolutionary hopes of cultural activists and artists, who are hoping for a free and unprecedented blossoming of culture, are falling apart in the face of economic priorities. In the words of Minister Klaus, this situation will persist for some time and, for some time to come, will get still worse. In other words, for the absolute majority of the population, culture will become a "nonessential item." Is not this attitude on the part of the state with respect to culture somehow tantamount to poor treatment? How do you see the position of our culture in this long-term period, say, up to the end of the millennium?

[Goldstuecker] As people say, this is a \$64,000 question. The leading officials of this country must decide whether they will consider culture, cultural activities, and creative activity as activities which will be fully subject to the laws of commerce or whether they will admit that culture has other important social functions than those which are purely commercial. It is clear that if the government were to persist strictly that culture must be self-supporting, that the competitive struggle even pertains to it, then this would palpably threaten culture. For example, operatic creations are no longer conceivable anywhere in the world without subsidies. We have no private patrons of the arts and so we are left with the only patron of the arts, the state. Or books and their publication. The European Economic Community has, for a number of years now, exerted pressure upon Great

Britain to institute a sales tax pertaining to the publication and sale of books and periodicals. And although it was the government of Mrs. Thatcher that felt that everything had to be self-supporting, that everything is subject to the laws of the marketplace, the government managed to fend off this pressure. I have no idea why it is just now that these giant taxes should be levied in Czechoslovakia against the production of books and periodicals. Twenty-two percent! The highest sales tax in Great Britain is 15 percent and I sense that it is still lower in the European Economic Community. This pressure will simply kill a sizable portion of our book production. For the time being, I do not know what the intentions are in taxing literary and artistic activity. Even under the previous regime, creative artists had tax advantages and if creative work is now to be taxed like, for example, the production of shoes, then this will palpably impact on the quantity and quality of creativity and, thus, on all of culture. Even in Thatcher's Great Britain, authors of books are paid additional honoraria, even on the basis of the frequency with which their books are checked out from public libraries.

I believe that the minister and his advisers should sit down to consider this problem and to take a look at whether existing and contemplated economic measures in culture are in order. We want to become part of Europe, we want to become part of the world, and we are looking for the most varied opportunities. And our creativity, strictly unrestricted by purely market practicalities, could be such a valuable contribution to European and world culture. We have rich cultural traditions, we have an enormous creative potential and experiences like few other nations. What is at stake is for our original creativity to become oriented toward our own sources and to contribute, from that vantage point, to the European and world cultural treasury. That is provided we do not concentrate (for economic reasons) on taking on that which has frequently already been predigested in the West. If, out of a longing for profit, we do not give priority, to put it simply, to the mass publication of pornography.

Freedom and worldliness do not lie in the fact that there is a striptease emporium on every street corner. That occurs in all sorts of places. Our newly found freedom should manifest itself in artistic projection based on

decades of collected tragic experiences. High-quality artistic work and the high culture of life are, I believe, the only valid contributions involved in our entry into Europe, of which we speak constantly today.

POLAND

Slowdown in Births, Infant Deaths Noted

91EP0229B Warsaw *ZYCIE WARSZAWY* in Polish
29 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Article by L.S.: "GUS [Central Office of Statistics] Estimates: How Many of Us There Are"]

[Text] The new year 1991 is welcoming 38.2 million Polish citizens who permanently reside in Poland. Compared to the figures at the end of 1989, there are 153,000 more of us, an increase of 0.4 percent. Of the total population, 61.9 percent live in towns (61.6 percent in 1989). There are 105 women for every 100 men. Out of the total population, about 57 percent are in their working years (women 18-59 and men 18-64), about 30 percent are of preemployment age, and about 13 percent are beyond working age (women 60 and over, men 65 and over).

In 1990, 256,000 marriages were recorded, exactly the same number as in 1989.

It is estimated that the number of births in 1990 is at the same level as last year, 562,000. The number of deaths was slightly higher than in 1989 (from 381,000 in 1989 to 365,000 in 1990). The systematic rise in the number of deaths observed during the 1980's is the result of the fact that Polish society is aging and that mortality has increased, mainly among the younger people in their productive years.

The birthrate, the difference between the number of births and deaths, was 177,000 in 1990, 4,000 lower than in 1989. This is the lowest birthrate observed during the postwar period.

In 1990 the favorable decline in infant mortality continued. It is estimated that during the entire year, about 8,500 children under one year of age died. This figure is 44 fewer than in 1989.

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